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Review| Volume 106, ISSUE 4, P678-697, December 2020

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Potential sources, modes of transmission and effectiveness of prevention measures against SARS-CoV-2

Published:September 18, 2020DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2020.09.022

      Summary

      During the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic new studies are emerging daily providing novel information about sources, transmission risks and possible prevention measures. In this review, we aimed to comprehensively summarize the current evidence on possible sources for SARS-CoV-2, including evaluation of transmission risks and effectiveness of applied prevention measures. Next to symptomatic patients, asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic carriers are a possible source with respiratory secretions as the most likely cause for viral transmission. Air and inanimate surfaces may be sources; however, viral RNA has been inconsistently detected. Similarly, even though SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected on or in personal protective equipment (PPE), blood, urine, eyes, the gastrointestinal tract and pets, these sources are currently thought to play a negligible role for transmission. Finally, various prevention measures such as handwashing, hand disinfection, face masks, gloves, surface disinfection or physical distancing for the healthcare setting and in public are analysed for their expected protective effect.

      Key words

      Introduction

      The cumulative number of COVID-19 cases continues to increase rapidly through different countries around the world [
      • Saglietto A.
      • D'Ascenzo F.
      • Zoccai G.B.
      • De Ferrari G.M.
      COVID-19 in Europe: the Italian lesson.
      ], however the exact source of transmission in new cases frequently remains unknown. Therefore, a variety of emergency responses and policy strategies mainly based on physical distancing measures with the aim to reduce close contact between people in public and healthcare facilities have been implemented in most countries [
      WHO
      Infection prevention and control during health care when novel coronavirus (nCoV) infection is suspected. Interim guidance. 19 March 2020.
      ]. In addition, a broad range of individual measurements such as plastic shields at cash registers, homemade face masks, wearing plastic gloves, disinfection of frequently touched surfaces can be seen in the public, indicating a great uncertainty how SARS-CoV-2 can and cannot be transmitted. In this review we summarized the current knowledge regarding potential sources of SARS-CoV-2 infection including the role of asymptomatic cases and body fluids and evaluated the potential capacity of different precautions to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

      Search strategy and selection criteria

      References for this review were identified through searches of PubMed for articles published until 26 June 2020. The following terms were used in combination with SARS-CoV-2: air (283 hits), viral load (182 hits), tear (43 hits), conjunctiva (26 hits), surface (292 hits), environmental (855 hits), pets (15 hits) and personal protective equipment (538 hits). In combination with COVID the following terms were used: viral load (199 hits), asymptomatic (776 hits), pets (15 hits) and cluster (492 hits). Additional relevant articles were identified in the authors' personal files. Articles were selected and data extracted when they provided evidence on viral carriage (symptomatic, asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic), viral load in body secretions and fluids, modes of transmission and contamination rates of objects.

      Infectious dose

      Humans can acquire devastating infectious diseases through exposure to very low levels of infectious particles. For example, only a few cells of Mycobacterium tuberculosis are required to overcome normal lung clearance and inactivation mechanisms in a susceptible host [
      • Cole E.C.
      • Cook C.E.
      Characterization of infectious aerosols in health care facilities: an aid to effective engineering controls and preventive strategies.
      ]. While the infectious dose for SARS-CoV-2 is currently still unknown, cell culture and animal experiments are warranted to provide more insights into the infectivity and infectious dose of SARS-CoV-2.

      Relevance to determine viral infectivity

      It is noteworthy that the presence of viral RNA in specimens does not always correlate with viral transmissibility and infectivity [
      • Joynt G.M.
      • Wu W.K.
      Understanding COVID-19: what does viral RNA load really mean?.
      ]. Hence, it was questioned early on whether SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA load correlates with culturable virus [
      • Zou L.
      • Ruan F.
      • Huang M.
      • Liang L.
      • Huang H.
      • Hong Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 viral load in upper respiratory specimens of infected patients.
      ]. One study showed that SARS-CoV-2 was detected by culture in 19 of 25 clinical samples (nasopharyngeal swab) from COVID-19 patients [
      • Gautret P.
      • Lagier J.C.
      • Parola P.
      • Hoang V.T.
      • Meddeb L.
      • Mailhe M.
      • et al.
      Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID-19: results of an open-label non-randomized clinical trial.
      ]. Another study showed that infectious virus isolated by culture was only detected during the first week of symptoms (16.7% of swab samples; 83.3% in sputum samples); no isolates were obtained from samples taken after day 8 in spite of ongoing high viral RNA loads [
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ]. In contrast, a significant correlation between Ct value and culture positivity rate was observed in nasopharyngeal samples [
      • La Scola B.
      • Le Bideau M.
      • Andreani J.
      • Hoang V.T.
      • Grimaldier C.
      • Colson P.
      • et al.
      Viral RNA load as determined by cell culture as a management tool for discharge of SARS-CoV-2 patients from infectious disease wards.
      ]. In a ferret model of H1N1 infection, the loss of viral culture positivity but not the absence of viral RNA coincided with the end of the infectious period. In fact, real-time reverse transcriptase poly-merase chain reaction (PCR) results remained positive 6–8 days after the loss of transmissibility [
      • Inagaki K.
      • Song M.S.
      • Crumpton J.C.
      • DeBeauchamp J.
      • Jeevan T.
      • Tuomanen E.I.
      • et al.
      Correlation between the interval of influenza virus infectivity and results of diagnostic assays in a ferret model.
      ]. For SARS coronavirus, viral RNA was detectable in the respiratory secretions and stools of some patients after onset of illness for more than 1 month, but live virus could not be detected by culture after week 3 [
      • Chan K.H.
      • Poon L.L.
      • Cheng V.C.
      • Guan Y.
      • Hung I.F.
      • Kong J.
      • et al.
      Detection of SARS coronavirus in patients with suspected SARS.
      ]. The inability to differentiate between infective and non-infective (dead or antibody-neutralized) viruses therefore remains a major limitation of nucleic acid detection methods. Despite this limitation, given the difficulties in culturing infectious virus from clinical specimens during a pandemic, using viral RNA load as a surrogate remains plausible for generating careful clinical hypotheses.

      Association of viral load with symptoms and outcome

      The association between viral load and clinical outcome including severity of symptoms is still poorly characterized although the majority of studies reported an association between higher viral loads and more severe symptoms [
      • Lescure F.X.
      • Bouadma L.
      • Nguyen D.
      • Parisey M.
      • Wicky P.H.
      • Behillil S.
      • et al.
      Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series.
      ,
      • Liu Y.
      • Yan L.M.
      • Wan L.
      • Xiang T.X.
      • Le A.
      • Liu J.M.
      • et al.
      Viral dynamics in mild and severe cases of COVID-19.
      ,
      • Pan Y.
      • Zhang D.
      • Yang P.
      • Poon L.L.M.
      • Wang Q.
      Viral load of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples.
      ,
      • Shi F.
      • Wu T.
      • Zhu X.
      • Ge Y.
      • Zeng X.
      • Chi Y.
      • et al.
      Association of viral load with serum biomakers among COVID-19 cases.
      ,
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ,
      • Yu F.
      • Yan L.
      • Wang N.
      • Yang S.
      • Wang L.
      • Tang Y.
      • et al.
      Quantitative detection and viral load analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in infected patients.
      ,
      • Yu X.
      • Sun S.
      • Shi Y.
      • Wang H.
      • Zhao R.
      • Sheng J.
      SARS-CoV-2 viral load in sputum correlates with risk of COVID-19 progression.
      ,
      • Zheng S.
      • Fan J.
      • Yu F.
      • Feng B.
      • Lou B.
      • Zou Q.
      • et al.
      Viral load dynamics and disease severity in patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 in Zhejiang province, China, January–March 2020: retrospective cohort study.
      ,
      • Guallar M.P.
      • Meiriño R.
      • Donat-Vargas C.
      • Corral O.
      • Jouvé N.
      • Soriano V.
      Inoculum at the time of SARS-CoV-2 exposure and risk of disease severity.
      ].

      Transmission dynamics

      Transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 are heterogeneous [
      • Frieden T.R.
      • Lee C.T.
      Identifying and interrupting superspreading events – implications for control of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
      ]. Numerous individual infection clusters in particular in Asia with variable size have been reported [
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yuan S.
      • Kok K.H.
      • To K.K.
      • Chu H.
      • Yang J.
      • et al.
      A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster.
      ,
      • Yong S.E.F.
      • Anderson D.E.
      • Wei W.E.
      • Pang J.
      • Chia W.N.
      • Tan C.W.
      • et al.
      Connecting clusters of COVID-19: an epidemiological and serological investigation.
      ,
      • Gao X.
      • Yuan Z.
      • Yang D.
      • Li H.
      • Zhang Y.
      • Gao P.
      • et al.
      A family cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infections.
      ,
      • Gao Y.
      • Shi C.
      • Chen Y.
      • Shi P.
      • Liu J.
      • Xiao Y.
      • et al.
      A cluster of the Corona Virus Disease 2019 caused by incubation period transmission in Wuxi, China.
      ,
      • Valent F.
      • Gallo T.
      • Mazzolini E.
      • Pipan C.
      • Sartor A.
      • Merelli M.
      • et al.
      A cluster of COVID-19 cases in a small Italian town: a successful example of contact tracing and swab collection.
      ,
      • Ye F.
      • Xu S.
      • Rong Z.
      • Xu R.
      • Liu X.
      • Deng P.
      • et al.
      Delivery of infection from asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19 in a familial cluster.
      ,
      • Wei X.S.
      • Wang X.R.
      • Zhang J.C.
      • Yang W.B.
      • Ma W.L.
      • Yang B.H.
      • et al.
      A cluster of health care workers with COVID-19 pneumonia caused by SARS-CoV-2.
      ,
      • Liu S.F.
      • Kuo N.Y.
      • Kuo H.C.
      Three Taiwan's domestic family cluster infections of coronavirus disease 2019.
      ,
      • Chen M.
      • Fan P.
      • Liu Z.
      • Pan R.
      • Huang S.
      • Li J.
      • et al.
      A SARS-CoV-2 familial cluster infection reveals asymptomatic transmission to children.
      ,
      • Qiu S.
      • Liu H.
      • Li P.
      • Jia H.
      • Du X.
      • Liu H.
      • et al.
      Familial cluster of SARS-CoV-2 infection associated with a railway journey.
      ,
      • Leclerc Q.J.
      • Fuller N.M.
      • Knight L.E.
      • Funk S.
      • Knight G.M.
      What settings have been linked to SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters?.
      ]. Originating from a single travel-associated primary case from China, the first documented chain of multiple human-to-human transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 outside of Asia allowed a detailed study of transmission events and identified several factors (e.g., cumulative face-to-face contact, direct contact with secretions or body fluids of a patient, PPE) to classify contacts as low or high risk [
      • Böhmer M.
      • Buchholz U.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Hoch M.
      • Katz K.
      • Marosevic D.
      • et al.
      Investigation of a COVID-19 outbreak in Germany resulting from a single travel-associated primary case: a case series.
      ]. Furthermore, factors such as immune suppression, increased disease severity and viral load, asymptomatic individuals, the practice of seeking care at multiple healthcare facilities, frequent inter-hospital transfer, large numbers of contacts and prolonged duration of exposure facilitate transmission [
      • Al-Tawfiq J.A.
      • Rodriguez-Morales A.J.
      Super-spreading events and contribution to transmission of MERS, SARS, and SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19).
      ]. Household transmission is also common [
      • Wang Z.
      • Ma W.
      • Zheng X.
      • Wu G.
      • Zhang R.
      Household transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
      ]. Superspreading is regarded as a normal feature of disease spread and has also been described with SARS-CoV-2 [
      • Lloyd-Smith J.O.
      • Schreiber S.J.
      • Kopp P.E.
      • Getz W.M.
      Superspreading and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence.
      ,
      • Hamner L.
      • Dubbel P.
      • Capron I.
      • Ross A.
      • Jordan A.
      • Lee J.
      • et al.
      High SARS-CoV-2 attack rate following exposure at a choir practice – Skagit County, Washington, March 2020.
      ]. Importantly, a recent study observed that transmission clusters occurred in many, predominantly indoor settings and most clusters involved fewer than 100 cases, with the exceptions being in healthcare (hospitals and elderly care), large religious gatherings, food-processing plants, schools, shopping centres, and large co-habiting settings (worker dormitories, prisons and ships) [
      • Leclerc Q.J.
      • Fuller N.M.
      • Knight L.E.
      • Funk S.
      • Knight G.M.
      What settings have been linked to SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters?.
      ]. Given the predominately mild, non-specific symptoms, infectiousness before symptom onset the successful containment of COVID-19 relies on stringent and urgent surveillance and infection-control measures.

      Epidemiological relevance of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 cases

      Based on the definition of the WHO a confirmed case is a person with laboratory confirmation (detection of viral genomic material) of SARS-CoV-2, irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms [
      WHO
      Global surveillance for COVID-19 caused by human infection with COVID-19 virus. Interim guidance. 20 March 2020.
      ]. Asymptomatic coronavirus infections have been described before [
      • Al-Tawfiq J.A.
      Asymptomatic coronavirus infection: MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19).
      ] and might together with pre-symptomatic spread form a potential source of COVID-19 infections acquired in a social or nosocomial context [
      • Ye F.
      • Xu S.
      • Rong Z.
      • Xu R.
      • Liu X.
      • Deng P.
      • et al.
      Delivery of infection from asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19 in a familial cluster.
      ,
      • Hu Z.B.
      • Ci C.
      [Screening and management of asymptomatic infection of corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19)].
      ,
      • Cai J.
      • Sun W.
      • Huang J.
      • Gamber M.
      • Wu J.
      • He G.
      Indirect virus transmission in cluster of COVID-19 Cases, Wenzhou, China, 2020.
      ,
      • Zhang J.
      • Tian S.
      • Lou J.
      • Chen Y.
      Familial cluster of COVID-19 infection from an asymptomatic.
      ,
      • Tong Z.D.
      • Tang A.
      • Li K.F.
      • Li P.
      • Wang H.L.
      • Yi J.P.
      • et al.
      Potential presymptomatic transmission of SARS-CoV-2, Zhejiang Province, China, 2020.
      ,
      • Li C.
      • Ji F.
      • Wang L.
      • Wang L.
      • Hao J.
      • Dai M.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic and human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a 2-family cluster, Xuzhou, China.
      ,
      • Bai Y.
      • Yao L.
      • Wei T.
      • Tian F.
      • Jin D.Y.
      • Chen L.
      • et al.
      Presumed asymptomatic carrier transmission of COVID-19.
      ]. In February 2020, a total of 44,672 confirmed cases were reported for China with a proportion of 1.2% of asymptomatic cases [
      • Anon
      [The epidemiological characteristics of an outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus diseases (COVID-19) in China].
      ]. Data from the first of April 2020 based on more rigorous testing of contact persons suggest in a small cohort of 166 new cases a proportion of 78% as asymptomatic cases [
      • Day M.
      Covid-19: four fifths of cases are asymptomatic, China figures indicate.
      ]. Irrespective of the frequency of asymptomatic carriers, they are considered to be important for the transmission of the disease [
      • Yu X.
      • Yang R.
      COVID-19 transmission through asymptomatic carriers is a challenge to containment.
      ]. Various studies reported SARS-CoV-2 infections, originating from asymptomatic carriers during close contacts such as household contacts or residents of a long-term-care skilled nursing facility [
      • Li C.
      • Ji F.
      • Wang L.
      • Wang L.
      • Hao J.
      • Dai M.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic and human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a 2-family cluster, Xuzhou, China.
      ,
      • Luo Y.
      • Trevathan E.
      • Qian Z.
      • Li Y.
      • Li J.
      • Xiao W.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Household Contacts of a Healthcare Provider, Wuhan, China.
      ,
      • Patel M.C.
      • Chaisson L.H.
      • Borgetti S.
      • Burdsall D.
      • Chugh R.K.
      • Hoff C.R.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19 mortality during an outbreak investigation in a skilled nursing facility.
      ,
      • Zhang H.J.
      • Su Y.Y.
      • Xu S.L.
      • Chen G.Q.
      • Li C.C.
      • Jiang R.J.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic and symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections in close contacts of COVID-19 patients: a seroepidemiological study.
      ,
      • Huff H.V.
      • Singh A.
      Asymptomatic transmission during the COVID-19 pandemic and implications for public health strategies.
      ,
      • Pan X.
      • Chen D.
      • Xia Y.
      • Wu X.
      • Li T.
      • Ou X.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic cases in a family cluster with SARS-CoV-2 infection.
      ]. Importantly, several studies have reported that viral RNA loads in pre-symptomatic, asymptomatic and symptomatic patients do not differ significantly [
      • Arons M.M.
      • Hatfield K.M.
      • Reddy S.C.
      • Kimball A.
      • James A.
      • Jacobs J.R.
      • et al.
      Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Transmission in a Skilled Nursing Facility.
      ,
      • Corman V.M.
      • Rabenau H.F.
      • Adams O.
      • Oberle D.
      • Funk M.B.
      • Keller-Stanislawski B.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 asymptomatic and symptomatic patients and risk for transfusion transmission.
      ,
      • Le T.Q.M.
      • Takemura T.
      • Moi M.L.
      • Nabeshima T.
      • Nguyen L.K.H.
      • Hoang V.M.P.
      • et al.
      Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Shedding by Travelers, Vietnam, 2020.
      ]. Others have reported no transmission from 455 contacts (patients, family members, hospital staff) to asymptomatic carriers and concluded that the infectivity of some asymptomatic carriers may be weak [
      • Gao M.
      • Yang L.
      • Chen X.
      • Deng Y.
      • Yang S.
      • Xu H.
      • et al.
      A study on infectivity of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 carriers.
      ].
      As summarized in Table I, the proportions of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 cases at the time point of testing have been determined for different cohorts of patients. In hospitalized patients it was described to range between 5.0% and 27.8% [
      • Tian S.
      • Hu N.
      • Lou J.
      • Chen K.
      • Kang X.
      • Xiang Z.
      • et al.
      Characteristics of COVID-19 infection in Beijing.
      ,
      • Anon
      Early epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 28 cases of coronavirus disease in South Korea.
      ,
      • Shi H.
      • Han X.
      • Jiang N.
      • Cao Y.
      • Alwalid O.
      • Gu J.
      • et al.
      Radiological findings from 81 patients with COVID-19 pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a descriptive study.
      ,
      • Qiu H.
      • Wu J.
      • Hong L.
      • Luo Y.
      • Song Q.
      • Chen D.
      Clinical and epidemiological features of 36 children with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Zhejiang, China: an observational cohort study.
      ]. In a long-term care facility, it was quite high at 56.5% [
      • Kimball A.
      • Hatfield K.M.
      • Arons M.
      • James A.
      • Taylor J.
      • Spicer K.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic and Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Residents of a Long-Term Care Skilled Nursing Facility - King County, Washington, March 2020.
      ]. In family clusters it was found to be between 25% and 57.1% [
      • Qian G.
      • Yang N.
      • Ma A.H.Y.
      • Wang L.
      • Li G.
      • Chen X.
      • et al.
      A COVID-19 Transmission within a family cluster by presymptomatic infectors in China.
      ,
      • Bai S.L.
      • Wang J.Y.
      • Zhou Y.Q.
      • Yu D.S.
      • Gao X.M.
      • Li L.L.
      • et al.
      [Analysis of the first cluster of cases in a family of novel coronavirus pneumonia in Gansu Province].
      ]. In 171 children in China, the proportion was 15.5% [
      • Lu X.
      • Zhang L.
      • Du H.
      • Zhang J.
      • Li Y.Y.
      • Qu J.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Children.
      ]. Among Japanese nationals evacuated from Wuhan by chartered flights it was 30.8% in contrast to German nationals with 1.8% [
      • Nishiura H.
      • Kobayashi T.
      • Suzuki A.
      • Jung S.M.
      • Hayashi K.
      • Kinoshita R.
      • et al.
      Estimation of the asymptomatic ratio of novel coronavirus infections (COVID-19).
      ,
      • Hoehl S.
      • Rabenau H.
      • Berger A.
      • Kortenbusch M.
      • Cinatl J.
      • Bojkova D.
      • et al.
      Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Returning Travelers from Wuhan, China.
      ]. On board a cruise ship, asymptomatic carriers were detected in 50.5% of the cases. The delay-adjusted asymptomatic proportion, however, was only 17.9% [
      • Mizumoto K.
      • Kagaya K.
      • Zarebski A.
      • Chowell G.
      Estimating the asymptomatic proportion of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020.
      ]. In Iceland, a proportion of 3.6% of the general population (13,080 of 364,000 inhabitants) were investigated. Overall, 100 of them (0.8%) were positive with a proportion of 43% asymptomatic carriers. Among inhabitants with a high risk for infection the proportion of asymptomatic cases was only 7% [
      • Gudbjartsson D.F.
      • Helgason A.
      • Jonsson H.
      • Magnusson O.T.
      • Melsted P.
      • Norddahl G.L.
      • et al.
      Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in the Icelandic Population.
      ]. Overall, asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections seem to account for up to 56% of SARS-CoV-2 infections in selected cohorts, suggesting that it is a significant factor for the rapid progression of the COVID-19 pandemic [
      • Arons M.M.
      • Hatfield K.M.
      • Reddy S.C.
      • Kimball A.
      • James A.
      • Jacobs J.R.
      • et al.
      Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Transmission in a Skilled Nursing Facility.
      ,
      • Oran D.P.
      • Topol E.J.
      Prevalence of Asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infection: A Narrative Review.
      ,
      • Treibel T.A.
      • Manisty C.
      • Burton M.
      • McKnight Á.
      • Lambourne J.
      • Augusto J.B.
      • et al.
      COVID-19: PCR screening of asymptomatic health-care workers at London hospital.
      ].
      Table IProportion of asymptomatic carriers in selected COVID-19 cohorts
      Type of cohortSize of cohortNumber of tested individualsNumber of positive tests (‘cases’)Proportion of asymptomatic cases at the time of testing (N)Reference
      Hospitalized COVID-19 patients in Peking2622622625.0% (13)[
      • Tian S.
      • Hu N.
      • Lou J.
      • Chen K.
      • Kang X.
      • Xiang Z.
      • et al.
      Characteristics of COVID-19 infection in Beijing.
      ]
      First 28 cases in South Korea28282810.7% (3)[
      • Anon
      Early epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 28 cases of coronavirus disease in South Korea.
      ]
      Hospitalized COVID-19 patients in Wuhan81818118.5% (15)[
      • Shi H.
      • Han X.
      • Jiang N.
      • Cao Y.
      • Alwalid O.
      • Gu J.
      • et al.
      Radiological findings from 81 patients with COVID-19 pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a descriptive study.
      ]
      Hospitalized COVID-19 children in Zhejiang36363627.8% (10)[
      • Qiu H.
      • Wu J.
      • Hong L.
      • Luo Y.
      • Song Q.
      • Chen D.
      Clinical and epidemiological features of 36 children with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Zhejiang, China: an observational cohort study.
      ]
      Long-term care facility82762356.5% (13)[
      • Kimball A.
      • Hatfield K.M.
      • Arons M.
      • James A.
      • Taylor J.
      • Spicer K.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic and Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Residents of a Long-Term Care Skilled Nursing Facility - King County, Washington, March 2020.
      ]
      Family cluster99825% (2)[
      • Qian G.
      • Yang N.
      • Ma A.H.Y.
      • Wang L.
      • Li G.
      • Chen X.
      • et al.
      A COVID-19 Transmission within a family cluster by presymptomatic infectors in China.
      ]
      Family aggregation77757.1% (4)[
      • Bai S.L.
      • Wang J.Y.
      • Zhou Y.Q.
      • Yu D.S.
      • Gao X.M.
      • Li L.L.
      • et al.
      [Analysis of the first cluster of cases in a family of novel coronavirus pneumonia in Gansu Province].
      ]
      Japanese nationals evacuated from Wuhan by chartered flights5655651330.8% (4)[
      • Nishiura H.
      • Kobayashi T.
      • Suzuki A.
      • Jung S.M.
      • Hayashi K.
      • Kinoshita R.
      • et al.
      Estimation of the asymptomatic ratio of novel coronavirus infections (COVID-19).
      ]
      German nationals evacuated from Wuhan by chartered flights1261142100% (2)[
      • Hoehl S.
      • Rabenau H.
      • Berger A.
      • Kortenbusch M.
      • Cinatl J.
      • Bojkova D.
      • et al.
      Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Returning Travelers from Wuhan, China.
      ]
      Passengers and crew members on board a cruise ship3711306363450.5% (320)[
      • Mizumoto K.
      • Kagaya K.
      • Zarebski A.
      • Chowell G.
      Estimating the asymptomatic proportion of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020.
      ]
      Children with known contact with persons having confirmed or suspected SARS-CoV-2 infection1391139117115.5% (27)[
      • Lu X.
      • Zhang L.
      • Du H.
      • Zhang J.
      • Li Y.Y.
      • Qu J.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Children.
      ]
      Iceland inhabitants with a high risk for infection9199919912217%
      No absolute numbers reported.
      [
      • Gudbjartsson D.F.
      • Helgason A.
      • Jonsson H.
      • Magnusson O.T.
      • Melsted P.
      • Norddahl G.L.
      • et al.
      Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in the Icelandic Population.
      ]
      Iceland general population3640001308010043%
      No absolute numbers reported.
      [
      • Gudbjartsson D.F.
      • Helgason A.
      • Jonsson H.
      • Magnusson O.T.
      • Melsted P.
      • Norddahl G.L.
      • et al.
      Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in the Icelandic Population.
      ]
      Children from family clusters74747429.7% (22)[
      • Sun D.
      • Zhu F.
      • Wang C.
      • Wu J.
      • Liu J.
      • Chen X.
      • et al.
      Children infected with SARS-CoV-2 from family clusters.
      ]
      Nursing facility89764856% (27)[
      • Arons M.M.
      • Hatfield K.M.
      • Reddy S.C.
      • Kimball A.
      • James A.
      • Jacobs J.R.
      • et al.
      Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Transmission in a Skilled Nursing Facility.
      ]
      Healthy passengers from cruise ship215215967% (6)[
      • Hung I.F.
      • Cheng V.C.
      • Li X.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Hung D.L.
      • Chiu K.H.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 shedding and seroconversion among passengers quarantined after disembarking a cruise ship: a case series.
      ]
      Asymptomatic healthcare workers103210323057% (17)[
      • Rivett L.
      • Sridhar S.
      • Sparkes D.
      • Routledge M.
      • Jones N.K.
      • Forrest S.
      • et al.
      Screening of healthcare workers for SARS-CoV-2 highlights the role of asymptomatic carriage in COVID-19 transmission.
      ]
      Aircraft carrier38238223818.5% (44)[
      • Payne D.C.
      • Smith-Jeffcoat S.E.
      • Nowak G.
      • Chukwuma U.
      • Geibe J.R.
      • Hawkins R.J.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 Infections and Serologic Responses from a Sample of U.S. Navy Service Members – USS Theodore Roosevelt, April 2020.
      ]
      Population of Vo’, Italy32762812
      First survey.
      7339.7% (29)[
      • Lavezzo E.
      • Franchin E.
      • Ciavarella C.
      • Cuomo-Dannenburg G.
      • Barzon L.
      • Del Vecchio C.
      • et al.
      Suppression of a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in the Italian municipality of Vo'.
      ]
      2343
      Second survey two weeks later.
      2944.8% (13)
      No absolute numbers reported.
      ∗∗ First survey.
      ∗∗∗ Second survey two weeks later.
      For comparison, the prevalence of asymptomatic influenza virus carriage (total absence of symptoms) ranged from 5.2% to 35.5% and subclinical cases (illness that did not meet the criteria for acute respiratory or influenza-like illness) between 25.4% and 61.8% [
      • Furuya-Kanamori L.
      • Cox M.
      • Milinovich G.J.
      • Magalhaes R.J.
      • Mackay I.M.
      • Yakob L.
      Heterogeneous and Dynamic Prevalence of Asymptomatic Influenza Virus Infections.
      ]. With MERS, a proportion of 9.5% of 1010 cases was asymptomatic [
      • Al-Tawfiq J.A.
      Asymptomatic coronavirus infection: MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19).
      ].
      Follow-up examinations, however, indicate that the majority of initially tested asymptomatic cases (70.8–100%) develop moderate but detectable clinical symptoms over time and therefore should be considered pre-symptomatic. Only in a small group of patients did no symptoms or radiological findings became apparent, but they were described as potentially infectious for up to 29 days (Table II) [
      • Hu Z.
      • Song C.
      • Xu C.
      • Jin G.
      • Chen Y.
      • Xu X.
      • et al.
      Clinical characteristics of 24 asymptomatic infections with COVID-19 screened among close contacts in Nanjing, China.
      ].
      Table IIClinical follow-up of asymptomatic carriers of SARS-CoV-2 in selected studies
      Number of asymptomatic casesDuration of follow-upNo symptoms or radiological findings during follow-upMild/moderate symptoms or radiological findings during follow-upSevere COVID-19 pneumoniaCommunicable periodTransmission to othersReference
      245–21 days7 (29.2%)17 (70.8%)
      Symptom onset one to three days after diagnosis.
      0Up to 29 daysOne case caused three infections in the family, one of them severe[
      • Hu Z.
      • Song C.
      • Xu C.
      • Jin G.
      • Chen Y.
      • Xu X.
      • et al.
      Clinical characteristics of 24 asymptomatic infections with COVID-19 screened among close contacts in Nanjing, China.
      ]
      55Unknown053 (96.4%)
      Symptom onset one to seven days after diagnosis.
      2 (3.6%)
      Symptom onset one to seven days after diagnosis.
      3–20 daysUnknown[
      • Wang Y.
      • Liu Y.
      • Liu L.
      • Wang X.
      • Luo N.
      • Ling L.
      Clinical outcome of 55 asymptomatic cases at the time of hospital admission infected with SARS-Coronavirus-2 in Shenzhen, China.
      ]
      1 (6-month-old child)17 days1 (single transient temperature of 38.5°C)0016 daysUnknown[
      • Kam K.Q.
      • Yung C.F.
      • Cui L.
      • Lin Tzer Pin R.
      • Mak T.M.
      • Maiwald M.
      • et al.
      A Well Infant with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with High Viral Load.
      ]
      1314 days10 (77%)30Up to 12 daysUnknown[
      • Kim S.E.
      • Jeong H.S.
      • Yu Y.
      • Shin S.U.
      • Kim S.
      • Oh T.H.
      • et al.
      Viral kinetics of SARS-CoV-2 in asymptomatic carriers and presymptomatic patients.
      ]
      Symptom onset one to three days after diagnosis.
      ∗∗ Symptom onset one to seven days after diagnosis.
      Of note, patients with negative PCR results prior to discharge may also become transient asymptomatic carriers again. One patient, for example, was retested positive for SARS-CoV-2 during the 2 weeks of quarantine after discharge [
      • Zhang J.F.
      • Yan K.
      • Ye H.H.
      • Lin J.
      • Zheng J.J.
      • Cai T.
      SARS-CoV-2 turned positive in a discharged patient with COVID-19 arouses concern regarding the present standard for discharge.
      ]. Two healthcare workers (HCWs) were also tested (throat swab) after discharge (COVID-19) and were weakly positive in two of seven samples and positive in one of seven samples (case 1 sampled over 10 days), and weakly positive in one of eight samples and positive in one of eight samples (case 2 sampled over 8 days) [
      • Xing Y.
      • Mo P.
      • Xiao Y.
      • Zhao O.
      • Zhang Y.
      • Wang F.
      Post-discharge surveillance and positive virus detection in two medical staff recovered from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), China, January to February 2020.
      ]. However, these results have to be interpreted with caution as currently applied PCR methods can lead to fluctuating results in weakly positive samples due to detection limits of the assays. Indeed, a single case was described with low viral RNA loads or negative RT-qPCR results, despite a SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by the presence of anti-SARS-CoV-2 specific antibodies [
      • Li Y.
      • Hu X.
      • Tu Y.
      • Wu T.
      • Wang B.
      • Ma H.
      • et al.
      A low viral dose in COVID-19 patient: a case report.
      ]. Importantly, a systematic meta-analysis of different cohort studies observed that asymptomatic patients with COVID-19 seems to correlate with young age and social activity [
      • Kronbichler A.
      • Kresse D.
      • Yoon S.
      • Lee K.H.
      • Effenberger M.
      • Shin J.I.
      Asymptomatic patients as a source of COVID-19 infections: A systematic review and meta-analysis.
      ,
      • de Souza T.H.
      • Nadal J.A.
      • Nogueira R.J.N.
      • Pereira R.M.
      • Brandão M.B.
      Clinical manifestations of children with COVID-19: A systematic review.
      ]. In particular, future studies aiming to understand the contribution of young patients such as children to asymptomatic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 should be prioritized [
      • Li X.
      • Xu W.
      • Dozier M.
      • He Y.
      • Kirolos A.
      • Theodoratou E.
      The role of children in transmission of SARS-CoV-2: a rapid review.
      ]. In summary, the prevalence of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection and duration of pre-symptomatic infection are not well understood, as asymptomatic individuals are not routinely tested. Studies on the immune response of asymptomatic carriers are lacking, which could contribute to a better characterization of the protective factors under natural conditions [
      • García L.F.
      Immune response, inflammation, and the clinical spectrum of COVID-19.
      ].

      Viral sources

      Several sources have been described that could possibly be involved in SARS-CoV-2 transmission based on the detection of viral RNA. These include the respiratory tract, air contamination, the gastrointestinal tract, eyes, inanimate surfaces, PPE, pets, and rather less likely blood and the urinary tract.

      Respiratory tract

      SARS-CoV-1 has been frequently associated with droplet-based transmission [
      • Scales D.C.
      • Green K.
      • Chan A.K.
      • Poutanen S.M.
      • Foster D.
      • Nowak K.
      • et al.
      Illness in intensive care staff after brief exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome.
      ,
      • Seto W.H.
      • Tsang D.
      • Yung R.W.H.
      • Ching T.Y.
      • Ng T.K.
      • Ho M.
      • et al.
      Effectiveness of precautions against droplets and contact in prevention of nosocomial transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
      ]. Likewise, person-to-person transmission has been assumed for SARS-CoV-2 very early [
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yuan S.
      • Kok K.H.
      • To K.K.
      • Chu H.
      • Yang J.
      • et al.
      A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster.
      ]. Importantly, a more efficient transmission of SARS-CoV-2 compared with SARS-CoV-1 has been suggested, due to active pharyngeal viral shedding while symptoms are still mild and typical of upper respiratory tract infection [
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ]. Table III summarizes the frequency and magnitude of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA loads in respiratory tract samples obtained from COVID-19 patients.
      Table IIIFrequency and magnitude of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA load in respiratory tract samples obtained from COVID-19 patients in selected studies
      Number of COVID 19 patientsRespiratory tract symptomsViral RNA loadAdditional informationReference
      7674 with symptoms (97.4%)

      2 without symptoms (2.6%)
      4.2 log10 cps
      Mean.
      (sputum)

      3.4 log10 cps
      Mean.
      (throat)

      2.8 log10 cps
      Mean.
      (nasal)
      Viral RNA load high in early and progressive stage of COVID-19[
      • Yu F.
      • Yan L.
      • Wang N.
      • Yang S.
      • Wang L.
      • Tang Y.
      • et al.
      Quantitative detection and viral load analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in infected patients.
      ]
      9Not described5.5–5.8 log10 cps
      Mean.
      (pharyngeal swab)

      6.8 log10 cpm
      Mean.
      (sputum)
      Lower viral RNA load in whole swab samples after day 5; infectious virus isolated by culture was only detected during the first week of symptoms (16.7% of swab samples; 83.3% in sputum samples); no isolates were obtained from samples taken after day 8 in spite of ongoing high viral RNA loads[
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ]
      65 with symptoms (83.3%)

      1 without symptoms (12.7%)
      1.0–4.0 log10 cpc (nasopharyngeal swab)

      1.0–3.0 log10 cpc (nasopharyngeal swab)
      Viral secretion stopped after 5–17 days (median: 11 days)[
      • Danis K.
      • Epaulard O.
      • Benet T.
      • Gaymard A.
      • Campoy S.
      • Bothelo-Nevers E.
      • et al.
      Cluster of coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) in the French Alps, 2020.
      ]
      5All with symptoms1.0–7.4 log10 cpc (nasopharyngeal swab)Viral RNA load decreased over time; 1 patient with virus detection after 24 days (death of patient)[
      • Lescure F.X.
      • Bouadma L.
      • Nguyen D.
      • Parisey M.
      • Wicky P.H.
      • Behillil S.
      • et al.
      Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series.
      ]
      23All with symptoms4.1–7.0 log10 cpm (posterior oropharyngeal saliva)
      Three patients with negative RNA test in saliva.
      Old age was associated with high viral RNA load; salivary viral RNA load was highest during the first week after symptom onset; one patient had viral RNA detected for up to 25 days after symptom onset[
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ]
      15All with symptoms4.6 log10 cpm (respiratory tract specimen)None[
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yip C.C.
      • To K.K.
      • Tang T.H.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Leung K.H.
      • et al.
      Improved molecular diagnosis of COVID-19 by the novel, highly sensitive and specific COVID-19-RdRp/Hel real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction assay validated in vitro and with clinical specimens.
      ]
      1With symptoms6.5 log10 cpm (pooled nasopharyngeal and throat swabs)

      6.8 log10 cpm (sputum)
      None[
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]
      82With symptoms2.8–11.1 log10 cpm (1 nasal swab, 67 throat swabs and 42 sputum)Median in sputum: 5.9 log10 cpm

      Median in throat samples: 4.9 log10 cpm
      [
      • Pan Y.
      • Zhang D.
      • Yang P.
      • Poon L.L.M.
      • Wang Q.
      Viral load of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples.
      ]
      2All with symptoms4.7–7.7 log10 cpm (naso- and oropharyngeal swabs)

      5.6–7.0 log10 cpm (sputum)
      None[
      • Kim J.Y.
      • Ko J.H.
      • Kim Y.
      • Kim Y.J.
      • Kim J.M.
      • Chung Y.S.
      • et al.
      Viral load kinetics of SARS-CoV-2 infection in first two patients in Korea.
      ]
      1817 with symptoms (94.4%)

      1 without symptoms (5.6%)
      Up to 7.2 log10 cpm (nasal and throat swabs)Viral RNA load decreased over time[
      • Zou L.
      • Ruan F.
      • Huang M.
      • Liang L.
      • Huang H.
      • Hong Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 viral load in upper respiratory specimens of infected patients.
      ]
      cpc, copies per 1000 cells; cpm, copies per mL; cps, copies per whole swab or sample.
      Mean.
      ∗∗ Three patients with negative RNA test in saliva.
      The viral RNA load with SARS-CoV-2 can be as high as 11.1 log10 cpm (Table III). It seems to be particularly high in the early and progressive stage of disease [
      • Yu F.
      • Yan L.
      • Wang N.
      • Yang S.
      • Wang L.
      • Tang Y.
      • et al.
      Quantitative detection and viral load analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in infected patients.
      ] or two days before and one day after symptom onset [
      • He X.
      • Lau E.H.Y.
      • Wu P.
      • Deng X.
      • Wang J.
      • Hao X.
      • et al.
      Temporal dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19.
      ]. However, in some cases RNA could still be found up to 51 days after the first positive test with negative results in between [
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ,
      • Carmo A.
      • Pereira-Vaz J.
      • Mota V.
      • Mendes A.
      • Morais C.
      • da Silva A.C.
      • et al.
      Clearance and persistence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in patients with COVID-19.
      ]. Influenza A virus RNA has even been released for up to 70 days with negative results in between although infectious virus was only detected for 5 days after symptom onset [
      • Wicker S.
      • Rabenau H.F.
      The virologist and the flu.
      ]. Age was also associated with high viral RNA load [
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ]. Most studies observed decreased viral RNA loads over time [
      • Zou L.
      • Ruan F.
      • Huang M.
      • Liang L.
      • Huang H.
      • Hong Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 viral load in upper respiratory specimens of infected patients.
      ,
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ]. One study shows that SARS-CoV-2 was detected by culture in 19 of 25 clinical samples (nasopharyngeal swab) from COVID-19 patients [
      • Gautret P.
      • Lagier J.C.
      • Parola P.
      • Hoang V.T.
      • Meddeb L.
      • Mailhe M.
      • et al.
      Hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin as a treatment of COVID-19: results of an open-label non-randomized clinical trial.
      ]. The viral RNA load detected in the asymptomatic patient was similar to that in the symptomatic patients, which suggests the transmission potential of asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic patients [
      • Zou L.
      • Ruan F.
      • Huang M.
      • Liang L.
      • Huang H.
      • Hong Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 viral load in upper respiratory specimens of infected patients.
      ]. It is important to differentiate between detection of RNA and the isolation of infectious virus in cell culture. PCR for RNA of SARS-CoV-2 does not distinguish between infectious virus and non-infectious nucleic acid. Thus, interpretation of duration of viral shedding and infection potential should be based on viable virus from cell culture and needs to be carefully evaluated when solely based on PCR results.

      Transmission via droplets and aerosols

      A strict distinction between droplet versus airborne transmission routes for infections is not possible [
      • Bahl P.
      • Doolan C.
      • de Silva C.
      • Chughtai A.A.
      • Bourouiba L.
      • MacIntyre C.R.
      Airborne or droplet precautions for health workers treating COVID-19?.
      ]. Virus transmission via droplets and aerosols enables many viruses to spread efficiently between humans [
      • Kutter J.S.
      • Spronken M.I.
      • Fraaij P.L.
      • Fouchier R.A.
      • Herfst S.
      Transmission routes of respiratory viruses among humans.
      ]. Airborne transmission is defined as the transmission of infection by expelled particles of comparatively small size and which can remain suspended in air for long periods of time [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. The World Health Organization uses a particle diameter of 5 μm to delineate between airborne (≤5 μm) and droplet (>5 μm) transmission [
      WHO
      Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations.
      ]. Transmission of infectious diseases by the airborne route is dependent on the interplay of several factors, including particle size (i.e. particle diameter) and the extent of desiccation [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. Particle desiccation is a critical variable and depending on environmental factors as even large, moisture-laden droplet particles desiccate rapidly [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. For example, Wells showed that particles begin desiccating immediately in a rapid fashion upon air expulsion: particles up to 50 μm can desiccate completely within approximately 0.5 s [
      • Wells W.F.
      On air-borne infection: study II. Droplets and droplet nuclei.
      ]. Rapid desiccation is a concern because the smaller and lighter the infectious particle, the longer it will potentially remain airborne. Hence, even when infectious agents are expelled from the respiratory tract in a matrix of mucus and other secretions, causing large, heavy particles, rapid desiccation can lengthen the time they remain airborne (the dried residuals of these large aerosols, termed droplet nuclei, are typically 0.5–12 μm in diameter) [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. Of further concern, very large aerosol particles may initially fall out of the air only to become airborne again once they have desiccated [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. One of the challenges facing practitioners, particularly in an enclosed building, is that even large-sized droplets can remain suspended in air for long periods. The reason is that droplets settle out of air on to a surface at a velocity dictated by their mass [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. If the upward velocity of the air in which they circulate exceeds this velocity, they remain airborne. Hence, droplet aerosols up to 100 μm diameter have been shown to remain suspended in air for prolonged periods when the velocity of air moving throughout a room exceeds the terminal settling velocity of the particle [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ].
      Respiratory virus shedding can occur via sneezing, coughing or talking. Sneezing distributes approximately 40,000 particles (droplets or airborne micro-organisms) per sneeze, coughing approximately 710 particles per cough, and talking approximately 36 particles per 100 words [
      • Fernstrom A.
      • Goldblatt M.
      Aerobiology and its role in the transmission of infectious diseases.
      ]. Using highly sensitive laser light scattering observations a recent study describes that loud speech can emit thousands of oral fluid droplets per second [
      • Stadnytskyi V.
      • Bax C.E.
      • Bax A.
      • Anfinrud P.
      The airborne lifetime of small speech droplets and their potential importance in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
      ], indicating that normal speaking may also contribute to virus transmission in stagnant air. Most of the 40,000 large-droplet particles caused by a single sneeze will desiccate immediately into small, infectious droplet nuclei, with 80% of the particles being smaller than 100 μm [
      • Cole E.C.
      • Cook C.E.
      Characterization of infectious aerosols in health care facilities: an aid to effective engineering controls and preventive strategies.
      ]. The transmission of infectious diseases via airborne or droplet routes may further also depend on the frequency of the initiating activity. A single sneeze may produce more total infectious particles, while overall coughing may potentially be a more effective route of airborne transmission (e.g. during infection with Coxsackievirus A) [
      • Couch R.B.
      • Cate T.R.
      • Douglas Jr., R.G.
      • Gerone P.J.
      • Knight V.
      Effect of route of inoculation on experimental respiratory viral disease in volunteers and evidence for airborne transmission.
      ]. Coronavirus-infected humans coughed on average 17 times over 30 min during exhaled breath collection [
      • Leung N.H.L.
      • Chu D.K.W.
      • Shiu E.Y.C.
      • Chan K.-H.
      • McDevitt J.J.
      • Hau B.J.P.
      • et al.
      Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks.
      ]. Given that dry cough is also a common symptom of COVID-19 patients [
      • Wang D.
      • Hu B.
      • Hu C.
      • Zhu F.
      • Liu X.
      • Zhang J.
      • et al.
      Clinical characteristics of 138 hospitalized patients with 2019 novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia in Wuhan, China.
      ], it may therefore contribute to potential airborne transmission of this pathogen. In this context, airborne transmission has been considered to be possible in a cluster of infections in a restaurant with air conditioning [
      • Lu J.
      • Gu J.
      • Li K.
      • Xu C.
      • Su W.
      • Lai Z.
      • et al.
      COVID-19 outbreak associated with air conditioning in restaurant, Guangzhou, China, 2020.
      ].
      Few studies are available that evaluated the role of air for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, most of them obtained in hospitals with COVID-19 patients. From the data shown in Table IV, viral copies were only detected in large air volumes of 9000 L with a larger proportion in intensive care units (ICUs) (35% detection rate) compared with general wards (12.5% detection rate). In smaller volumes such as 90 L, 1200 L or 1.5 m3 no virus was detected. Even directly in front of a COVID-19 patient it was not possible to detect the SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the air [
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]. The viral RNA loads of the first confirmed case were 3.3 × 106 copies per mL in the pooled nasopharyngeal and throat swabs and 5.9 × 106 copies per mL in saliva on the day of air sampling [
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]. The air samples of 1000 L were collected at a distance of 10 cm at the level of patient's chin while the patient performed four different manoeuvres (i.e. normal breathing, deep breathing, speaking ‘1, 2, 3’ continuously, and coughing continuously) while putting on and taking off the surgical mask were all undetectable for SARS-CoV-2 RNA [
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]. Nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by an airborne route has been described to be very unlikely [
      • Wong S.C.
      • Kwong R.T.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Chan J.W.M.
      • Chu M.Y.
      • Lee S.Y.
      • et al.
      Risk of nosocomial transmission of coronavirus disease 2019: an experience in a general ward setting in Hong Kong.
      ]. Nonetheless, SARS-CoV-2 can remain infectious in air for 3 h measured in a Goldberg drum with a decline of viral load from 3.5 log10 to 2.7 log10 per litre of air [
      • van Doremalen N.
      • Bushmaker T.
      • Morris D.H.
      • Holbrook M.G.
      • Gamble A.
      • Williamson B.N.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1.
      ]. In a subset of four study participants with a symptomatic seasonal coronavirus infection but without any coughing during the 30 min exhaled breath collection, no coronavirus RNA was detected in respiratory droplets or aerosols [
      • Leung N.H.L.
      • Chu D.K.W.
      • Shiu E.Y.C.
      • Chan K.-H.
      • McDevitt J.J.
      • Hau B.J.P.
      • et al.
      Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks.
      ].
      Table IVFrequency of detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in air samples
      Setting (country)Placement of samplerSampled volumes of airDetection of viral RNAAdditional informationReference
      Hospital rooms of confirmed COVID-19 patients (Iran)2–5 m away from patients with severe and critical symptoms, height of 1.5–1.8 m10 samples of 90 LNoneNone[
      • Faridi S.
      • Niazi S.
      • Sadeghi K.
      • Naddafi K.
      • Yavarian J.
      • Shamsipour M.
      • et al.
      A field indoor air measurement of SARS-CoV-2 in the patient rooms of the largest hospital in Iran.
      ]
      General ward with 8 air supplies and 12 air discharges per hourGeneral ward: different regions around the patient under the air inlet, and in the patient corridorGeneral ward: 16 samples of 9000 LGeneral ward: 2 samples (12.5%)Highest detection rate in patients' rooms (8 of 18; 44.4%), followed by near air outlets (5 of 15; 33.3%) and doctors office area (1 of 8; 12.5%)[
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]
      ICU with 12 air supplies and 16 air discharges per hour (China)ICU: different regions near the air outlet, near the patients and around the doctors' office areaICU: 40 samples of 9000 LICU: 14 samples (35%)
      Dedicated SARS-CoV-2 outbreak centre with 12 air exchanges per hour (Singapore)In patient room and anteroom6 samples of 1200 LNoneNone[
      • Ong S.W.X.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Chia P.Y.
      • Lee T.H.
      • Ng O.T.
      • Wong M.S.Y.
      • et al.
      Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient.
      ]
      Outside the patient room6 samples of 1.5 m3None
      Isolation ward with 12 air exchanges per hour (China)Negative pressure non-intensive care unit6 samples of 1500 LNoneNone[
      • Wei L.
      • Lin J.
      • Duan X.
      • Huang W.
      • Lu X.
      • Zhou J.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic COVID-19 patients can contaminate their surroundings: an environment sampling study.
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation rooms with 12 air exchanges per hour (Hong Kong)Umbrella fitted with transparent plastic curtains as an air shelter to cover patients; 10 cm distance to patient's chin10 samples of 1000 LNoneDirect sneezing on air filter: 1 of 5 samples positive; direct spitting on air filter: 5 of 5 samples positive[
      • Cheng V.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chan V.W.
      • So S.Y.
      • Chen J.H.
      • Yip C.C.
      • et al.
      Air and environmental sampling for SARS-CoV-2 around hospitalized patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
      ]
      COVID-19 hospital (China)Different departments in medical areas44 samples of unknown volumeNoneNone[
      • Wu S.
      • Wang Y.
      • Jin X.
      • Tian J.
      • Liu J.
      • Mao Y.
      Environmental contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in a designated hospital for coronavirus disease 2019.
      ]
      COVID-19 cases in isolation at home (Germany)Middle of room most frequently used by residents15 samples of 3000 LNoneNone[
      • Döhla M.
      • Wilbring G.
      • Schulte B.
      • Kümmerer B.M.
      • Diegmann C.
      • Sib E.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 in environmental samples of quarantined households.
      ]
      Isolation rooms for COVID-19 patients (Ireland)Surrounding of COVID-19 patients16 samples of unknown volumeNoneNone[
      • Jerry J.
      • O'Regan E.
      • O'Sullivan L.
      • Lynch M.
      • Brady D.
      Do established infection prevention and control measures prevent spread of SARS-CoV-2 to the hospital environment beyond the patient room?.
      ]
      Intensive care units in designated COVID-19 hospital (China)At the head of the bed within one meter of the patient's head58 samples of 840 L
      NIOSH sampler.
      or 420 L
      DingBlue sampler.
      1.7%Detection near the head of the patient (1 sample)[
      • Lei H.
      • Ye F.
      • Liu X.
      • Huang Z.
      • Ling S.
      • Jiang Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 environmental contamination associated with persistently infected COVID-19 patients.
      ]
      Isolation wards in designated COVID-19 hospital (China)Patient rooms and bathroom38 samples of 840 L
      NIOSH sampler.
      or 420 L
      DingBlue sampler.
      7.9%Detection in bathroom (2 samples) and the patient room (1 sample)[
      • Lei H.
      • Ye F.
      • Liu X.
      • Huang Z.
      • Ling S.
      • Jiang Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 environmental contamination associated with persistently infected COVID-19 patients.
      ]
      ICU, intensive care unit.
      NIOSH sampler.
      ∗∗ DingBlue sampler.
      Other aspects influencing droplet or airborne transmission are temperature and humidity because they correlate with the spread of and deaths associated with COVID-19 [
      • Bashir M.F.
      • Ma B.
      • Bilal
      • Komal B.
      • Bashir M.A.
      • Tan D.
      • et al.
      Correlation between climate indicators and COVID-19 pandemic in New York, USA.
      ,
      • Ma Y.
      • Zhao Y.
      • Liu J.
      • He X.
      • Wang B.
      • Fu S.
      • et al.
      Effects of temperature variation and humidity on the death of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China.
      ,
      • Yuan S.
      • Jiang S.C.
      • Li Z.L.
      Do humidity and temperature impact the spread of the novel coronavirus?.
      ]. In China, the number of confirmed cases increased with higher temperature and higher humidity in most of the provinces [
      • Al-Rousan N.
      • Al-Najjar H.
      The correlation between the spread of COVID-19 infections and weather variables in 30 Chinese provinces and the impact of Chinese government mitigation plans.
      ,
      • Yao M.
      • Zhang L.
      • Ma J.
      • Zhou L.
      On airborne transmission and control of SARS-Cov-2.
      ]. COVID-19 lethality significantly worsened (four times on average) with environmental temperatures between 4°C and 12°C and relative humidity between 60% and 80% [
      • Scafetta N.
      Distribution of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and its monthly forecast based on seasonal climate patterns.
      ]. Biktasheva et al., however, described that the COVID-19 mortality correlates with low air humidity, probably caused by a lower resistivity of dry or very dry mucous membranes [
      • Biktasheva I.V.
      Role of a habitat's air humidity in Covid-19 mortality.
      ]. Huang et al. described that 60% of all COVID-19 cases are found in places with an air temperature between 5°C and 15°C [
      • Huang Z.
      • Huang J.
      • Gu Q.
      • Du P.
      • Liang H.
      • Dong Q.
      Optimal temperature zone for the dispersal of COVID-19.
      ]. In Brazil a 1°C increase in temperature has been associated with a decrease in confirmed cases of 8% [
      • Pequeno P.
      • Mendel B.
      • Rosa C.
      • Bosholn M.
      • Souza J.L.
      • Baccaro F.
      • et al.
      Air transportation, population density and temperature predict the spread of COVID-19 in Brazil.
      ]. In Wuhan and Xiaogan, temperature was the only meteorological parameter constantly but inversely correlated with COVID-19 incidence [
      • Li H.
      • Xu X.L.
      • Dai D.W.
      • Huang Z.Y.
      • Ma Z.
      • Guan Y.J.
      Air Pollution and temperature are associated with increased COVID-19 incidence: a time series study.
      ]. At low temperature and low humidity, droplets tend to remain suspended in air [
      • Rohit A.
      • Rajasekaran S.
      • Karunasagar I.
      • Karunasagar I.
      Fate of respiratory droplets in tropical vs temperate environments and implications for SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
      ]. High relative humidity will increase the droplet sizes due to the hygroscopic growth effect, which increases the deposition fractions on both humans and the ground [
      • Feng Y.
      • Marchal T.
      • Sperry T.
      • Yi H.
      Influence of wind and relative humidity on the social distancing effectiveness to prevent COVID-19 airborne transmission: A numerical study.
      ]. Overall, a seasonal pattern of COVID-19 is very likely.
      SARS-CoV-2 aerosolized from infected patients and deposited on surfaces could remain infectious outdoors for considerable time during the winter in many temperate-zone cities, with continued risk for re-aerosolization and human infection [
      • Sagripanti J.L.
      • Lytle C.D.
      Estimated inactivation of coronaviruses by solar radiation with special reference to COVID-19.
      ]. Conversely, SARS-CoV-2 should be inactivated in the environment relatively fast during summer in many populous cities of the world, indicating that sunlight should have a role in the occurrence, spread rate, and duration of coronavirus pandemics [
      • Sagripanti J.L.
      • Lytle C.D.
      Estimated inactivation of coronaviruses by solar radiation with special reference to COVID-19.
      ]. Simulated sunlight has been described to rapidly inactivate SARS-CoV-2 [
      • Ratnesar-Shumate S.
      • Williams G.
      • Green B.
      • Krause M.
      • Holland B.
      • Wood S.
      • et al.
      Simulated Sunlight Rapidly Inactivates SARS-CoV-2 on Surfaces.
      ,
      • Schuit M.
      • Ratnesar-Shumate S.
      • Yolitz J.
      • Williams G.
      • Weaver W.
      • Green B.
      • et al.
      Airborne SARS-CoV-2 is rapidly inactivated by simulated sunlight.
      ].
      Indoor transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is much more likely compared with outdoor transmission [
      • Morawska L.
      • Cao J.
      Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: The world should face the reality.
      ]. In a closed seafood market, the risk of a customer acquiring SARS-CoV-2 infection via the aerosol route after 1 h exposure in the market with one infected shopkeeper was about 2.23 × 10−5. The risk rapidly decreased outside the market due to the dilution by ambient air and became below 10−6 at 5 m away from the exit [
      • Zhang X.
      • Ji Z.
      • Yue Y.
      • Liu H.
      • Wang J.
      Infection risk assessment of COVID-19 through aerosol transmission: a Case Study of South China Seafood Market.
      ]. Outdoor, these virus particles are very strongly diluted by the open air [
      • Scheuch G.
      Breathing is enough: for the spread of influenza virus and SARS-CoV-2 by breathing only.
      ].

      Gastrointestinal tract/stool

      Some patients displayed diarrhoea at the beginning or during the course of infection suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 may also affect the gastrointestinal tract. Viral RNA was detected in a proportion between 9.1% and 100% in COVID-19 patients with up to 8.1 log10 viral copies per g (Table V). One study including 46 patients with 16 of them reporting gastrointestinal manifestations (35%) reported diarrhoea as the most common symptom (15%), followed by abdominal pain (11%), dyspepsia (11%), and nausea (2%) [
      • Park S.K.
      • Lee C.W.
      • Park D.I.
      • Woo H.Y.
      • Cheong H.S.
      • Shin H.C.
      • et al.
      Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in Fecal Samples from Patients with Asymptomatic and Mild COVID-19 in Korea.
      ]. Analysing two groups of overall 12 patients, none of the stool samples resulted in successful virus isolation in cell culture, irrespective of viral RNA concentration [
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ,
      • Kim J.M.
      • Kim H.M.
      • Lee E.J.
      • Jo H.J.
      • Yoon Y.
      • Lee N.J.
      • et al.
      Detection and isolation of SARS-CoV-2 in serum, urine, and stool specimens of COVID-19 patients from the Republic of Korea.
      ]. In contrast, one study described the successful isolation of virus by cell culture from two of three patients [
      • Xiao F.
      • Sun J.
      • Xu Y.
      • Li F.
      • Huang X.
      • Li H.
      • et al.
      Infectious SARS-CoV-2 in feces of patient with severe COVID-19.
      ]. Of note, another study showed higher viral RNA loads in faecal samples of mildly symptomatic or asymptomatic children compared with nasopharyngeal swabs [
      • Han M.S.
      • Seong M.W.
      • Kim N.
      • Shin S.
      • Cho S.I.
      • Park H.
      • et al.
      Viral RNA load in mildly symptomatic and asymptomatic children with COVID-19, Seoul.
      ]. These results indicate the possibility of faecal–oral transmission or faecal–respiratory transmission through aerosolized faeces. Furthermore, the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in bile juice was reported from one patient and it was speculated that RNA in faecal specimens may partly originate from bile juice [
      • Han D.
      • Fang Q.
      • Wang X.
      SARS-CoV-2 was found in the bile juice from a patient with severe COVID-19.
      ]. Finally, a recent study suggested that detectable SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the digestive tract could be a potential warning indicator of severe disease [
      • Lin W.
      • Xie Z.
      • Li Y.
      • Li L.
      • Wen C.
      • Cao Y.
      • et al.
      Association between detectable SARS-COV-2 RNA in anal swabs and disease severity in patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019.
      ], however further evidence will be needed.
      Table VFrequency and magnitude of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA load in stool or rectal swab samples obtained from COVID-19 patients
      Number of COVID 19 patientsGastrointestinal symptomsViral RNA in stool or rectal swab samplesViral RNA loadAdditional informationReference
      5915 with symptoms (25.4%)9 patients (15.3%)4.7 log10 cpm5.1 log10 cpm in patients with diarrhoea, 3.9 log10 cpm in patients without diarrhoea[
      • Cheung K.S.
      • Hung I.F.
      • Chan P.P.
      • Lung K.C.
      • Tso E.
      • Liu R.
      • et al.
      Gastrointestinal manifestations of SARS-CoV-2 infection and virus load in fecal samples from the Hong Kong Cohort and systematic review and meta-analysis.
      ]
      44 without symptoms (74.6%)4 patients (9.1%)
      51 with symptoms (20%)2 patients (40%)6.2–8.1 log10 cpgDetection on days 2–19[
      • Lescure F.X.
      • Bouadma L.
      • Nguyen D.
      • Parisey M.
      • Wicky P.H.
      • Behillil S.
      • et al.
      Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series.
      ]
      4 without symptoms (80%)
      15Not described for the subgroup4 patients (26.7%)Not describedNone[
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ]
      15Not describedNumber of patients not described3.6 log10 cpmNone[
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yip C.C.
      • To K.K.
      • Tang T.H.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Leung K.H.
      • et al.
      Improved molecular diagnosis of COVID-19 by the novel, highly sensitive and specific COVID-19-RdRp/Hel real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction assay validated in vitro and with clinical specimens.
      ]
      17Not described9 patients (52.9%)2.7–5.1 log10 cpmNone[
      • Pan Y.
      • Zhang D.
      • Yang P.
      • Poon L.L.M.
      • Wang Q.
      Viral load of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples.
      ]
      4Not described4 patients (100%)3–8 log10 cpsVirus isolation from stool samples was unsuccessful, irrespective of viral RNA concentration[
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ]
      4616 with symptoms (35%), 30 without symptoms (65%)2 patients (4%)Ct values 29.9None[
      • Park S.K.
      • Lee C.W.
      • Park D.I.
      • Woo H.Y.
      • Cheong H.S.
      • Shin H.C.
      • et al.
      Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in Fecal Samples from Patients with Asymptomatic and Mild COVID-19 in Korea.
      ]
      38Not described8 patients (21%)6.5 log10 cpmMean; virus isolation from stool samples was unsuccessful[
      • Kim J.M.
      • Kim H.M.
      • Lee E.J.
      • Jo H.J.
      • Yoon Y.
      • Lee N.J.
      • et al.
      Detection and isolation of SARS-CoV-2 in serum, urine, and stool specimens of COVID-19 patients from the Republic of Korea.
      ]
      28Not described12 patients (42.9%)2.8–3.5 log10 PFU equivalent per mLVirus isolation in 2 out of 3 patients successful[
      • Xiao F.
      • Sun J.
      • Xu Y.
      • Li F.
      • Huang X.
      • Li H.
      • et al.
      Infectious SARS-CoV-2 in feces of patient with severe COVID-19.
      ]
      12Not described11 patients (92%)4.1–10.3 log10 cpmChildren; median RNA load in fecal samples significantly higher than for nasopharyngeal swab specimens[
      • Han M.S.
      • Seong M.W.
      • Kim N.
      • Shin S.
      • Cho S.I.
      • Park H.
      • et al.
      Viral RNA load in mildly symptomatic and asymptomatic children with COVID-19, Seoul.
      ]
      cpg, copies per g; cpm, copies per mL; cps, copies per whole swab; PFU, plaque-forming units.

      Eyes

      Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through the ocular surface was considered to be possible [
      • Lu C.W.
      • Liu X.F.
      • Jia Z.F.
      2019-nCoV transmission through the ocular surface must not be ignored.
      ]. Conjunctivitis has been reported in a patient in the middle phase of COVID-19, the conjunctival swab specimens remained positive for SARS-CoV-2 on 14 and 17 days after onset and were negative on day 19 [
      • Chen L.
      • Liu M.
      • Zhang Z.
      • Qiao K.
      • Huang T.
      • Chen M.
      • et al.
      Ocular manifestations of a hospitalised patient with confirmed 2019 novel coronavirus disease.
      ]. Another study showed among 30 COVID-19 patients that the virus was detected in tears and conjunctival secretions only in the one patient with conjunctivitis [
      • Xia J.
      • Tong J.
      • Liu M.
      • Shen Y.
      • Guo D.
      Evaluation of coronavirus in tears and conjunctival secretions of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection.
      ]. Furthermore, in another group of 38 COVID-19 patients two of them were identified with positive findings for SARS-CoV-2 in their conjunctival as well as nasopharyngeal specimens, a total of 12 patients had ocular manifestations consistent with conjunctivitis, including conjunctival hyperaemia, chemosis, epiphora, or increased secretions [
      • Wu P.
      • Duan F.
      • Luo C.
      • Liu Q.
      • Qu X.
      • Liang L.
      • et al.
      Characteristics of ocular findings of patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Hubei Province, China.
      ]. In addition, no virus was detected on the conjunctiva in five other COVID-19 patients [
      • Lescure F.X.
      • Bouadma L.
      • Nguyen D.
      • Parisey M.
      • Wicky P.H.
      • Behillil S.
      • et al.
      Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series.
      ]. One patient was described with persistent conjunctivitis with viral RNA detection until day 27 after symptom onset and confirmation of infectious virus in the first RNA-positive ocular sample [
      • Colavita F.
      • Lapa D.
      • Carletti F.
      • Lalle E.
      • Bordi L.
      • Marsella P.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 isolation from ocular secretions of a patient with COVID-19 in Italy with prolonged viral RNA detection.
      ]. Even though the virus can be detected rarely in the conjunctival sac at very low levels [
      • Karimi S.
      • Arabi A.
      • Shahraki T.
      • Safi S.
      Detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome Coronavirus-2 in the tears of patients with Coronavirus disease 2019.
      ,
      • Atum M.
      • Boz A.A.E.
      • Çakır B.
      • Karabay O.
      • Köroğlu M.
      • Öğütlü A.
      • et al.
      Evaluation of Conjunctival Swab PCR Results in Patients with SARS-CoV-2 Infection.
      ], there is no evidence that it can replicate locally [
      • Guo D.
      • Xia J.
      • Shen Y.
      • Tong J.
      SARS-CoV-2 may be related to conjunctivitis but not necessarily spread through the conjunctiva SARS-CoV-2 and conjunctiva.
      ]. That is why the conjunctiva were considered not to be the preferred gateway into the respiratory tract [
      • Liu Z.
      • Sun C.B.
      Conjunctiva is not a preferred gateway of entry for SARS-CoV-2 to infect respiratory tract.
      ].
      A study analysed human post-mortem eyes for the expression of ACE2 (the receptor for SARS-CoV-2) and TMPRSS2. In all samples the expression of ACE2 and TMPRSS2 was detected in the conjunctiva, limbus, and cornea, with especially prominent staining in the superficial conjunctival and corneal epithelial surface [
      • Zhou L.
      • Xu Z.
      • Castiglione G.M.
      • Soiberman U.S.
      • Eberhart C.G.
      • Duh E.J.
      ACE2 and TMPRSS2 are expressed on the human ocular surface, suggesting susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection.
      ]. In contrast, another study from Germany found no relevant conjunctival expression of the ACE2 receptor on mRNA and protein levels [
      • Lange C.
      • Wolf J.
      • Auw-Haedrich C.
      • Schlecht A.
      • Boneva S.
      • Lapp T.
      • et al.
      Expression of the COVID-19 receptor ACE2 in the human conjunctiva.
      ]. In summary, the detailed pathophysiology of ocular transmission of SARS-CoV-2 remains not completely understood [
      • Ho D.
      • Low R.
      • Tong L.
      • Gupta V.
      • Veeraraghavan A.
      • Agrawal R.
      COVID-19 and the ocular surface: a review of transmission and manifestations.
      ] and both the presence of viral particles in tears and conjunctiva, and the potential for conjunctival transmission remains controversial [
      • Emparan J.P.O.
      • Sardi-Correa C.
      • López-Ulloa J.A.
      • Viteri-Soria J.
      • Penniecook J.A.
      • Jimenez-Román J.
      • et al.
      COVID-19 and the eye: how much do we really know? A best evidence review.
      ]. In conclusion, spread of COVID-19 from ocular secretions cannot be ruled out but seems to be very unlikely.

      Inanimate surfaces

      Indirect transmission of COVID-19 has been assumed to be possible via fomites although direct evidence is currently not available [
      • Pung R.
      • Chiew C.J.
      • Young B.E.
      • Chin S.
      • Chen M.I.
      • Clapham H.E.
      • et al.
      Investigation of three clusters of COVID-19 in Singapore: implications for surveillance and response measures.
      ]. In hospitals some data were collected to describe the frequency of detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA on inanimate surfaces in the immediate patient surroundings. The detection rate was variable on ICU surfaces (0–75%), in isolation rooms (1.4–100%) and on general wards (0–61%). The mean virus concentrations per swab were 4.4–5.2 log10 on ICUs and 2.8–4.0 log10 on general wards. A positive correlation between patient viral RNA load and positivity rate of surface samples was described [
      • Cheng V.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chan V.W.
      • So S.Y.
      • Chen J.H.
      • Yip C.C.
      • et al.
      Air and environmental sampling for SARS-CoV-2 around hospitalized patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
      ]. However, on cleaned and disinfected surfaces viral RNA could mostly not be detected (Table VI). Detection of viral RNA on the floor is indicative for sedimentation of contaminated droplets.
      Table VIFrequency of detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA on inanimate surfaces
      Setting (country)Types of sampled surfaces (N)Proportion of virus detectionMean virus concentration (log10 cps)Reference
      COVID-19 isolation room (Singapore)Bedding, cot rail and table (1 m distance to bed)100%Ct values between 37.8 and 28.7[
      • Yung C.F.
      • Kam K.Q.
      • Wong M.S.Y.
      • Maiwald M.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Tan B.H.
      • et al.
      Environment and personal protective equipment tests for SARS-CoV-2 in the isolation room of an infant with infection.
      ]
      ICU with COVID-19 patients (China)Computer mouse (8)75%4.4[
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]
      Floor (10)70%4.8
      Air outlet filter (12)67%5.2
      Trash can (5)60%4.5
      Sickbed handrail (14)43%4.6
      Dedicated SARS-CoV-2 outbreak centre (Singapore)Room C: 26 surfaces (28 swabs) in a patient room before routine cleaning with sodium dichloroisocyanurate (0.5% on high touch surfaces, 0.1% on floors)61%Unknown[
      • Ong S.W.X.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Chia P.Y.
      • Lee T.H.
      • Ng O.T.
      • Wong M.S.Y.
      • et al.
      Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient.
      ]
      Room B: 26 surfaces after routine cleaning0%
      Room A: 26 surfaces after routine cleaning0%
      Surfaces in 27 hospital rooms of COVID-19 patients (Singapore)Various surfaces (245)56.7%
      Proportion of room with at least one environmental surface contaminated.
      Unknown[
      • Chia P.Y.
      • Coleman K.K.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Ong S.W.X.
      • Gum M.
      • Lau S.K.
      • et al.
      Detection of air and surface contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in hospital rooms of infected patients.
      ]
      Isolation rooms for COVID-19 patients (Ireland)Various surfaces in isolation rooms (26)42.3%Unknown[
      • Jerry J.
      • O'Regan E.
      • O'Sullivan L.
      • Lynch M.
      • Brady D.
      Do established infection prevention and control measures prevent spread of SARS-CoV-2 to the hospital environment beyond the patient room?.
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation ward (China)112 surfaces in patient rooms and the toilet area at least 4 h after first daily surface disinfection with 0.2% chlorine solution39.3%Unknown[
      • Wei L.
      • Lin J.
      • Duan X.
      • Huang W.
      • Lu X.
      • Zhou J.
      • et al.
      Asymptomatic COVID-19 patients can contaminate their surroundings: an environment sampling study.
      ]
      Centralized quarantine hotel (China)Various surfaces (22)36.4%Ct values between 28.8 and 37.6[
      • Jiang F.C.
      • Jiang X.L.
      • Wang Z.G.
      • Meng Z.H.
      • Shao S.F.
      • Anderson B.D.
      • et al.
      Detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 RNA on surfaces in quarantine rooms.
      ]
      General ward with COVID-19 patients (China)Sickbed handrail (10)20%4.0[
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]
      Doorknob (12)8%3.5
      Floor (12)8%2.8
      Air outlet (12)0%
      COVID-19 hospital (China)200 samples from various surfaces frequently touched by patients or healthcare workers19.0%Unknown[
      • Wu S.
      • Wang Y.
      • Jin X.
      • Tian J.
      • Liu J.
      • Mao Y.
      Environmental contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in a designated hospital for coronavirus disease 2019.
      ]
      Clinical microbiology laboratory (France)22 samples from various surfaces18.2%Unknown[
      • Bloise I.
      • Gómez-Arroyo B.
      • García-Rodríguez J.
      Detection of SARS-CoV-2 on high-touch surfaces in a clinical microbiology laboratory.
      ]
      Intensive care unit and isolation ward (South Korea)57 surfaces in patient rooms, the ante room, the floor of an adjacent common corridor and the nursing station 1–72 h after last disinfection17.5%Unknown[
      • Ryu B.H.
      • Cho Y.
      • Cho O.H.
      • Hong S.I.
      • Kim S.
      • Lee S.
      Environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19 outbreak in South Korea.
      ]
      Surfaces frequently touched by COVID-19 patients (Korea)Surfaces in a rehabilitation centre and an apartment building complex (12)16.7%
      Door handles.
      Unknown[
      • Lee S.E.
      • Lee D.Y.
      • Lee W.G.
      • Kang B.
      • Jang Y.S.
      • Ryu B.
      • et al.
      Detection of novel coronavirus on the surface of environmental materials contaminated by COVID-19 patients in the Republic of Korea.
      ]
      Surfaces in hospitals (68)0%
      After cleaning and disinfection.
      Different wards in grade III hospital (China)626 samples from surfaces on different wards13.6%Unknown[
      • Ye G.
      • Lin H.
      • Chen S.
      • Wang S.
      • Zeng Z.
      • Wang W.
      • et al.
      Environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare premises.
      ]
      Regular 4-bed rooms used for asymptomatic COVID-19 patients (South Korea)22 surfaces in patient rooms, the ante room, the floor of an adjacent common corridor and the nursing station 184 h after last disinfection13.6%Unknown[
      • Ryu B.H.
      • Cho Y.
      • Cho O.H.
      • Hong S.I.
      • Kim S.
      • Lee S.
      Environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19 outbreak in South Korea.
      ]
      COVID-19 cases in hospitals (Italy)Various surfaces (26)7.7%
      ∗∗∗∗ Detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 was attempted in all samples and was consistently negative.
      Unknown[
      • Colaneri M.
      • Seminari E.
      • Novati S.
      • Asperges E.
      • Biscarini S.
      • Piralla A.
      • et al.
      Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 RNA contamination of inanimate surfaces and virus viability in a health care emergency unit.
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation ward (China)Various surfaces; routine daily disinfection with 0.1% chlorine dioxide (84)7.1%Unknown[
      • Wang H.
      • Mo P.
      • Li G.
      • Chen P.
      • Liu J.
      • Wang H.
      • et al.
      Environmental virus surveillance in the isolation ward of COVID-19.
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation rooms (Hong Kong)377 surfaces in patient rooms before daily disinfection with 0.1% sodium hypochlorite5.0%2.0–5.0 log cpm[
      • Cheng V.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chan V.W.
      • So S.Y.
      • Chen J.H.
      • Yip C.C.
      • et al.
      Air and environmental sampling for SARS-CoV-2 around hospitalized patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
      ]
      COVID-19 cases in isolation at home (Germany)Surfaces in 21 households (119)3.4%
      ∗∗∗∗ Detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 was attempted in all samples and was consistently negative.
      Unknown[
      • Döhla M.
      • Wilbring G.
      • Schulte B.
      • Kümmerer B.M.
      • Diegmann C.
      • Sib E.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 in environmental samples of quarantined households.
      ]
      Dedicated general ward for COVID-19 cases (Singapore)Various high touch surfaces in the patient surrounding and toilet area prior to terminal cleaning (445)2.2%Unknown[
      • Liang En Ian W.
      • Sim X.Y.J.
      • Conceicao E.P.
      • Aung M.K.
      • Tan K.Y.
      • Ko K.K.K.
      • et al.
      Containing COVID-19 outside the isolation ward: the impact of an infection control bundle on environmental contamination and transmission in a cohorted general ward.
      ]
      Intensive care unit and ordinary ward with COVID-19 cases (Taiwan)144 samples from 16 different surfaces1.4%
      ∗∗∗∗∗ Only on ventilator tubing before HME filter.
      Ct values between 30.4 and 31.8[
      • Su W.L.
      • Hung P.P.
      • Lin C.P.
      • Chen L.K.
      • Lan C.C.
      • Yang M.C.
      • et al.
      Masks and closed-loop ventilators prevent environmental contamination by COVID-19 patients in negative-pressure environments.
      ]
      Designated COVID-19 hospital (China)Various surfaces on isolation ward (144)1.4%Ct values between 38.6 and 44.9[
      • Lei H.
      • Ye F.
      • Liu X.
      • Huang Z.
      • Ling S.
      • Jiang Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 environmental contamination associated with persistently infected COVID-19 patients.
      ]
      COVID-19 patient roomBench, bedside rail, locker, bed table, alcohol dispenser and window bench (unknown)1 positive sample on window bench2.8 log10 cpm[
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]
      COVID-19 ward (Italy)Various surfaces considered as high risk for contamination; routine daily disinfection with 0.1% sodium hypochlorite as free chlorine0%[
      • Colaneri M.
      • Seminari E.
      • Piralla A.
      • Zuccaro V.
      • Filippo A.D.
      • Baldanti F.
      • et al.
      Lack of SARS-CoV-2 RNA environmental contamination in a tertiary referral hospital for infectious diseases in Northern Italy.
      ]
      COVID-19 patient rooms (Japan)15 surfaces in close contact with the patient and medical staff after surface disinfection0%[
      • Hirotsu Y.
      • Maejima M.
      • Nakajima M.
      • Mochizuki H.
      • Omata M.
      Environmental cleaning is effective for the eradication of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in contaminated hospital rooms: A patient from the Diamond Princess cruise ship.
      ]
      Home of an asymptomatic quarantined SARS-CoV-2-carrier with persistently high viral loads (Korea)Surfaces in household (12)0%[
      • Shin K.S.
      • Park H.S.
      • Lee J.
      • Lee J.K.
      Environmental surface testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) during prolonged isolation of an asymptomatic carrier.
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation ward (China)Various surfaces; routine daily disinfection with 0.1% chlorine dioxide (36)0%[
      • Wang J.
      • Feng H.
      • Zhang S.
      • Ni Z.
      • Ni L.
      • Chen Y.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 RNA detection of hospital isolation wards hygiene monitoring during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 outbreak in a Chinese hospital.
      ]
      Designated COVID-19 hospital (China)Various surfaces on intensive care units (160)0%[
      • Lei H.
      • Ye F.
      • Liu X.
      • Huang Z.
      • Ling S.
      • Jiang Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 environmental contamination associated with persistently infected COVID-19 patients.
      ]
      cpm, copies per mL; cps, copies per swab.
      Proportion of room with at least one environmental surface contaminated.
      ∗∗ Door handles.
      ∗∗∗ After cleaning and disinfection.
      ∗∗∗∗ ∗∗∗∗ Detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 was attempted in all samples and was consistently negative.
      ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗∗∗∗∗ Only on ventilator tubing before HME filter.
      Surfaces outside the COVID-19 patient room were also investigated. On ICU the virus was rarely detected as ‘weak positive’ on the floor and on door knobs in three buffer rooms, six dressing rooms and a nurse station (six of 84 samples; 7.1%) [
      • Wang H.
      • Mo P.
      • Li G.
      • Chen P.
      • Liu J.
      • Wang H.
      • et al.
      Environmental virus surveillance in the isolation ward of COVID-19.
      ]. On the general ward the virus was rarely detected on the patient floor (23 samples; one ‘weak positive’ result on the computer mouse or keyboard) and never detected on doorknobs and the floor in three buffer rooms and five dressing rooms (52 samples) [
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]. Viral RNA could be detected even 28 days after discharge of COVID-19 on surfaces of pagers and in drawers of the isolation wards. The relevance of this finding, however, is not clear because it is not known if infectious virus was present at that time [
      • Zhou Y.
      • Zeng Y.
      • Chen C.
      Presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in isolation ward environment 28 days after exposure.
      ].
      In a microbiology laboratory the detection rate on surfaces was 18.2%. In the domestic environment of SARS-CoV-2 carriers, the detection rate on surfaces was overall low (0–3.4%; Table VI).
      It has to be mentioned that in most studies only PCR was performed for RNA. But detection of viral RNA on surfaces does not provide any information about viral infectivity or viability [
      • Zhang D.X.
      SARS-CoV-2: air/aerosols and surfaces in laboratory and clinical settings.
      ]. New findings from a COVID-19 cohort in Gangelt, Germany, and with cases in Italy provide data on the detection of infectious SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces. Although viral RNA was detected in 3.4% of 119 surface samples in 21 households of confirmed COVID-19-cases and on 7.7% of sampled surfaces around COVID-19-cases in Italy, infectious SARS-CoV-2 was not found in any sample [
      • Döhla M.
      • Wilbring G.
      • Schulte B.
      • Kümmerer B.M.
      • Diegmann C.
      • Sib E.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 in environmental samples of quarantined households.
      ,
      • Colaneri M.
      • Seminari E.
      • Novati S.
      • Asperges E.
      • Biscarini S.
      • Piralla A.
      • et al.
      Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 RNA contamination of inanimate surfaces and virus viability in a health care emergency unit.
      ]. Similar findings were described with SARS-CoV and influenza-virus. In Canada, a total of 85 samples from inanimate surfaces were taken in a SARS-hospital. Viral SARS-CoV RNA was present in 5.6% of samples, but none of the samples revealed infectious virus [
      • Booth T.F.
      • Kournikakis B.
      • Bastien N.
      • Ho J.
      • Kobasa D.
      • Stadnyk L.
      • et al.
      Detection of airborne severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus and environmental contamination in SARS outbreak units.
      ]. In Thailand and Taiwan, RNA of SARS-CoV was detected on 27.7% of 94 surface samples in a SARS-hospital or in a SARS-ward; in none of the samples was infectious SARS-CoV found [
      • Dowell S.F.
      • Simmerman J.M.
      • Erdman D.D.
      • Wu J.S.
      • Chaovavanich A.
      • Javadi M.
      • et al.
      Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces.
      ]. Similar data were reported from 90 households with proven H1N1 influenza virus infections in children. Viral RNA was detected on 17.8% of inanimate surfaces but virus could never be cultured [
      • Simmerman J.M.
      • Suntarattiwong P.
      • Levy J.
      • Gibbons R.V.
      • Cruz C.
      • Shaman J.
      • et al.
      Influenza virus contamination of common household surfaces during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in Bangkok, Thailand: implications for contact transmission.
      ].
      In cell culture studies, SARS-CoV-2 has been described to remain infectious on stainless steel and plastic for three to four days, on glass and banknotes for two days, on wood for one day, all with a decrease of viral infectivity with time [
      • van Doremalen N.
      • Bushmaker T.
      • Morris D.H.
      • Holbrook M.G.
      • Gamble A.
      • Williamson B.N.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1.
      ,
      • Chin A.W.H.
      • Chu J.T.S.
      • Perera M.R.A.
      • Hui K.P.Y.
      • Yen H.L.
      • Chan M.C.W.
      • et al.
      Stability of SARS-CoV-2 in different environmental conditions.
      ]. In the close surrounding of COVID-19 patients in hospitals SARS-CoV-2 RNA is detected more frequently compared with surfaces outside the patient rooms but samples were so far consistently negative for infectious virus. Whether infectious SARS-CoV-2 may be detected in a relevant amount on various surfaces in public when only a short exposure to potentially infected, may be even asymptomatic people exists, is currently unknown but very unlikely. Surfaces in air planes or trains in coughing or sneezing distance for potentially infected long-distance travellers may theoretically have a higher risk for contamination.

      PPE

      The RNA of SARS-CoV-2 has so far mainly been found on PPE used by HCWs on ICU (0–50%), mainly on shoes and gloves. In other settings PPE was only very rarely contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 (Table VII). All studies performed PCR assays for SARS-CoV-2 RNA detection.
      Table VIIFrequency of detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA on personal protective equipment (PPE) of healthcare workers
      Type of ward (country)Types of sampled surfaces (N)Proportion of virus detectionMean virus concentration (log10 cps)Reference
      ICU with COVID-19 patients (China)Shoe sole (6)50%4.5[
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]
      Glove (4)25%4.5
      Sleeve cuff (6)17%4.9
      Face shield (6)0%
      General ward with COVID-19 patients (China)Shoe sole (3)0%[
      • Guo Z.D.
      • Wang Z.Y.
      • Zhang S.F.
      • Li X.
      • Li L.
      • Li C.
      • et al.
      Aerosol and surface distribution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in hospital wards, Wuhan, China, 2020.
      ]
      Glove (3)0%
      Sleeve cuff (3)0%
      Face shield (3)0%
      COVID-19 isolation room (Singapore)Face shield (1)0%[
      • Yung C.F.
      • Kam K.Q.
      • Wong M.S.Y.
      • Maiwald M.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Tan B.H.
      • et al.
      Environment and personal protective equipment tests for SARS-CoV-2 in the isolation room of an infant with infection.
      ]
      N95 mask (1)0%
      Waterproof gown (1)0%
      COVID-19 isolation room (Singapore)Different surfaces from PPEs (30)0%[
      • Ong S.W.X.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Sutjipto S.
      • Chia P.Y.
      • Young B.E.
      • Gum M.
      • et al.
      Absence of contamination of personal protective equipment (PPE) by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).
      ]
      COVID-19 isolation room (Singapore)Different surfaces from PPEs (10)10% (front of shoes)Ct value of 38.96
      Indicating a low viral RNA load.
      [
      • Ong S.W.X.
      • Tan Y.K.
      • Chia P.Y.
      • Lee T.H.
      • Ng O.T.
      • Wong M.S.Y.
      • et al.
      Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient.
      ]
      Different wards in grade III hospital (China)Hand sanitizer dispenser (59)20.3%Unknown[
      • Ye G.
      • Lin H.
      • Chen S.
      • Wang S.
      • Zeng Z.
      • Wang W.
      • et al.
      Environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare premises.
      ]
      Glove (78)15.4%
      Eye protection or face shield (58)1.7%
      COVID-19 negative pressure isolation room (South Korea)Different surfaces from PPEs (133)11.3%
      Mainly on the top of the head and the foot dorsum.
      Unknown[
      • Jung J.
      • Kim J.Y.
      • Bae S.
      • Cha H.H.
      • Kim E.O.
      • Kim M.J.
      • et al.
      Contamination of personal protective equipment by SARS-CoV-2 during routine care of patients with mild COVID-19.
      ]
      cps, copies per swab.
      Indicating a low viral RNA load.
      ∗∗ Mainly on the top of the head and the foot dorsum.

      Blood

      SARS-CoV-2 RNA has occasionally been detected in blood of COVID-19 patients, i.e. in one of five patients on days 7, 8, 9 and 12 after onset of disease [
      • Lescure F.X.
      • Bouadma L.
      • Nguyen D.
      • Parisey M.
      • Wicky P.H.
      • Behillil S.
      • et al.
      Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series.
      ], in five of 23 COVID-19 patients (21.7%) [
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ], in zero of 18 asymptomatic and symptomatic patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection [
      • Corman V.M.
      • Rabenau H.F.
      • Adams O.
      • Oberle D.
      • Funk M.B.
      • Keller-Stanislawski B.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 asymptomatic and symptomatic patients and risk for transfusion transmission.
      ], or in three of 307 samples (1.0%) obtained from 205 COVID-19 patients [
      • Wang W.
      • Xu Y.
      • Gao R.
      • Lu R.
      • Han K.
      • Wu G.
      • et al.
      Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in different types of clinical specimens.
      ]. SARS-CoV-2 RNA can very rarely (in four of 2430 samples) be detected in plasma during routine screening of blood donors considered to be healthy population [
      • Chang L.
      • Zhao L.
      • Gong H.
      • Wang L.
      • Wang L.
      Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 RNA detected in blood donations.
      ]. Detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in blood is considered a strong indicator for further clinical severity [
      • Chen W.
      • Lan Y.
      • Yuan X.
      • Deng X.
      • Li Y.
      • Cai X.
      • et al.
      Detectable 2019-nCoV viral RNA in blood is a strong indicator for the further clinical severity.
      ]. So far, no cases of transmission due to transfusion of blood products have been reported for SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV-2, and clinically ill patients are not considered as blood donors [
      • Corman V.M.
      • Rabenau H.F.
      • Adams O.
      • Oberle D.
      • Funk M.B.
      • Keller-Stanislawski B.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 asymptomatic and symptomatic patients and risk for transfusion transmission.
      ]. Therefore, no immediate risk can be derived for the transfusion system [
      • Corman V.M.
      • Rabenau H.F.
      • Adams O.
      • Oberle D.
      • Funk M.B.
      • Keller-Stanislawski B.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 asymptomatic and symptomatic patients and risk for transfusion transmission.
      ]. Based on the existing evidence, transmission of COVID-19 by handling potentially contaminated blood products (laboratory technician) or by contact with blood, e.g., from a wound to intact skin is very unlikely.

      Urinary tract

      SARS-CoV-2 RNA has occasionally been detected in urine swabs from patients. In nine patients with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections, one of the patients was positive for viral RNA in urine [
      • Peng L.
      • Liu J.
      • Xu W.
      • Luo Q.
      • Chen D.
      • Lei Z.
      • et al.
      SARS-CoV-2 can be detected in urine, blood, anal swabs, and oropharyngeal swabs specimens.
      ]. This observation is supported by observations among 12 SARS-CoV-2 positive children with two of them positive for viral RNA in urine (17%) [
      • Han M.S.
      • Seong M.W.
      • Kim N.
      • Shin S.
      • Cho S.I.
      • Park H.
      • et al.
      Viral RNA load in mildly symptomatic and asymptomatic children with COVID-19, Seoul.
      ]. Importantly, infectious virus could be detected from urine in one COVD-19 patient [
      • Sun J.
      • Zhu A.
      • Li H.
      • Zheng K.
      • Zhuang Z.
      • Chen Z.
      • et al.
      Isolation of infectious SARS-CoV-2 from urine of a COVID-19 patient.
      ]. However, other studies with a total of 47 patients [
      • Wolfel R.
      • Corman V.M.
      • Guggemos W.
      • Seilmaier M.
      • Zange S.
      • Muller M.A.
      • et al.
      Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019.
      ,
      • To K.K.
      • Tsang O.T.
      • Leung W.S.
      • Tam A.R.
      • Wu T.C.
      • Lung D.C.
      • et al.
      Temporal profiles of viral load in posterior oropharyngeal saliva samples and serum antibody responses during infection by SARS-CoV-2: an observational cohort study.
      ,
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yip C.C.
      • To K.K.
      • Tang T.H.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Leung K.H.
      • et al.
      Improved molecular diagnosis of COVID-19 by the novel, highly sensitive and specific COVID-19-RdRp/Hel real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction assay validated in vitro and with clinical specimens.
      ] failed to detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA in urine. These data indicate that urine might be a potential source of infection but further evidence is needed.

      Semen

      There is evidence that the main entry receptor of SARS-CoV-2, ACE2, is expressed in cells of the reproductive system [
      • Fu J.
      • Zhou B.
      • Zhang L.
      • Balaji K.S.
      • Wei C.
      • Liu X.
      • et al.
      Expressions and significances of the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 gene, the receptor of SARS-CoV-2 for COVID-19.
      ,
      • Wang Z.
      • Xu X.
      scRNA-seq profiling of human testes reveals the presence of the ACE2 receptor, a target for SARS-CoV-2 Infection in spermatogonia, Leydig and Sertoli Cells.
      ]. However, one study with 23 COVID-19 patients in the acute (12 patients) and recovery phases (11 patients) failed to detect viral RNA in semen [
      • Guo L.
      • Zhao S.
      • Li W.
      • Wang Y.
      • Li L.
      • Jiang S.
      • et al.
      Absence of SARS-CoV-2 in Semen of a COVID-19 Patient Cohort.
      ], indicating a low probability of sexual transmission through semen.

      Breast milk

      SARS-CoV-2 RNA has temporarily been detected in breast milk samples in one study in one of two infected mothers with approximately 105 viral copies per mL [
      • Groß R.
      • Conzelmann C.
      • Müller J.A.
      • Stenger S.
      • Steinhart K.
      • Kirchhoff F.
      • et al.
      Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in human breastmilk.
      ]. Similarly, the presence of viral RNA was reported in breast milk of an actively breastfeeding mildly symptomatic COVID-19 patient raising the possibility of a potential transmission from breast milk [
      • Tam P.C.K.
      • Ly K.M.
      • Kernich M.L.
      • Spurrier N.
      • Lawrence D.
      • Gordon D.L.
      • et al.
      Detectable severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in human breast milk of a mildly symptomatic patient with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
      ].

      Pets

      Thus far, no evidence for transmission of the virus from pet animals to humans exists [
      • Ji W.
      • Wang W.
      • Zhao X.
      • Zai J.
      • Li X.
      Cross-species transmission of the newly identified coronavirus 2019-nCoV.
      ]. However, Shi et al. reported that ferrets and cats were highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, while dogs had a low susceptibility and livestock including pigs, chickens, and ducks were not susceptible to the virus, under experimental conditions [
      • Shi J.
      • Wen Z.
      • Zhong G.
      • Yang H.
      • Wang C.
      • Huang B.
      • et al.
      Susceptibility of ferrets, cats, dogs, and other domesticated animals to SARS-coronavirus 2.
      ]. One of 22 cats (France) and two of 10 cats (Wuhan) of COVID-19 patients has been described to have a SARS-CoV-2 infection with mild respiratory and digestive symptoms whereas all 11 dogs (France) and eight of nine dogs (Wuhan) were SARS-CoV-2 and serologically negative [
      • Sailleau C.
      • Dumarest M.
      • Vanhomwegen J.
      • Delaplace M.
      • Caro V.
      • Kwasiborski A.
      • et al.
      First detection and genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 in an infected cat in France.
      ,
      • Chen J.
      • Huang C.
      • Zhang Y.
      • Zhang S.
      • Jin M.
      Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2-Specific Antibodies in Pets in Wuhan, China.
      ]. Interestingly, viral transmission between cats has been observed [
      • Shi J.
      • Wen Z.
      • Zhong G.
      • Yang H.
      • Wang C.
      • Huang B.
      • et al.
      Susceptibility of ferrets, cats, dogs, and other domesticated animals to SARS-coronavirus 2.
      ]. Out of six naïve cats (three subadults and three juveniles), each exposed to a SARS-CoV-2 inoculated cat, transmission occurred in two cats (one cat of each age group). Similar findings were reported by Halfmann et al. [
      • Halfmann P.J.
      • Hatta M.
      • Chiba S.
      • Maemura T.
      • Fan S.
      • Takeda M.
      • et al.
      Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in domestic cats.
      ]. This indicates that cats, being common companion animals, might theoretically transmit the virus to other animals and humans. However, there is so far no clear evidence that cat-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 can occur.

      Control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission

      Several practices are recommended with the aim to limit further transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical practice but also public settings. These include handwashing, hand disinfection, wearing of face masks and gloves, disinfection of surfaces and physical distance. Based on an integrated theoretical and statistical analysis of the influence of individual variation in infectiousness on disease emergence it has been suggested that individual-specific control measures outperform population-wide measures [
      • Lloyd-Smith J.O.
      • Schreiber S.J.
      • Kopp P.E.
      • Getz W.M.
      Superspreading and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence.
      ].

      Handwashing

      A hand soap solution (1:49) has been described to have some effect (≥3.6 log10 reduction of viral infectivity) against SARS-CoV-2 in 5 min [
      • Chin A.W.H.
      • Chu J.T.S.
      • Perera M.R.A.
      • Hui K.P.Y.
      • Yen H.L.
      • Chan M.C.W.
      • et al.
      Stability of SARS-CoV-2 in different environmental conditions.
      ]. For HCWs handwashing is only useful when hands are visibly soiled [
      WHO
      WHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care. First global patient safety challenge clean care is safer care.
      ]. Although SARS-CoV-2 has never been detected on hands of the public population yet, it seems reasonable to assume that the hand contamination by droplets from others may take place in the public with an unknown viral load. Apart from avoiding hand–face contacts in general, handwashing is the first choice for the decontamination of hands, especially after returning home from public places with many close contacts with potentially infected people.

      Hand disinfection

      Ethanol and iso-propanol inactivate SARS-CoV-2 at concentration between 30% and 80% (both v/v) in 30 s [
      • Kratzel A.
      • Todt D.
      • V'Kovski P.
      • Steiner S.
      • Gultom M.
      • Thao T.T.N.
      • et al.
      Inactivation of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 by WHO-recommended hand rub formulations and alcohols.
      ]. Both WHO-recommended hand rubs based on 75% iso-propanol or 80% ethanol (both v/v) also inactivate SARS-CoV-2 in only 30 s [
      • Kratzel A.
      • Todt D.
      • V'Kovski P.
      • Steiner S.
      • Gultom M.
      • Thao T.T.N.
      • et al.
      Inactivation of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 by WHO-recommended hand rub formulations and alcohols.
      ]. Similar results were obtained with a propanol-based hand rub against SARS-CoV [
      • Rabenau H.F.
      • Kampf G.
      • Cinatl J.
      • Doerr H.W.
      Efficacy of various disinfectants against SARS coronavirus.
      ]. On clean hands use of an alcohol-based hand rub is first choice in healthcare for the decontamination of hands due to the better activity against nosocomial pathogens including bacteria and yeasts and a better dermal tolerance [
      WHO
      WHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care. First global patient safety challenge clean care is safer care.
      ]. It may also be useful for COVID-19 patients, e.g., before leaving the patient's room for examinations. In this situation it is reasonable to recommend a hand disinfection in order to reduce potential transmission by direct hand contacts. The routine use of alcohol-based hand rubs for the general population should be discouraged, since there are currently no clear indications when to use them. It may be useful if a contamination of hands with SARS-CoV-2 is likely and a handwashing facility is not available. Otherwise the widespread use of alcohol-based hand rubs may even enhance the shortage of the products in patient care which should be avoided by all means [
      • Kampf G.
      • Scheithauer S.
      • Lemmen S.
      • Saliou P.
      • Suchomel M.
      COVID-19-associated shortage of alcohol-based hand rubs, face masks, medical gloves and gowns - proposal for a risk-adapted approach to ensure patient and healthcare worker safety.
      ].

      Face masks

      Inadequate PPE including facemasks at the beginning of the epidemic in China has resulted in infections and deaths among HCWs [
      • Wang J.
      • Zhou M.
      • Liu F.
      Reasons for healthcare workers becoming infected with novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in China.
      ,
      • Zhan M.
      • Qin Y.
      • Xue X.
      • Zhu S.
      Death from Covid-19 of 23 health care workers in China.
      ]. Unprotected patient care with long and close contacts was also later a major risk for HCWs to acquire COVID-19 [
      • Heinzerling A.
      • Stuckey M.J.
      • Scheuer T.
      • Xu K.
      • Perkins K.M.
      • Resseger H.
      • et al.
      Transmission of COVID-19 to health care personnel during exposures to a hospitalized patient – Solano County, California, February 2020..
      ]. In COVID-19 cases face masks can at least reduce the viral spread. In 17 individuals with a symptomatic seasonal coronavirus infection a surgical face mask was able to reduce the proportion of viral RNA detection in droplets from 30% to 0% and in aerosols from 40% to 0% during 30 min exhaled breath collection, suggesting a protective effect when worn by infected patients [
      • Leung N.H.L.
      • Chu D.K.W.
      • Shiu E.Y.C.
      • Chan K.-H.
      • McDevitt J.J.
      • Hau B.J.P.
      • et al.
      Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks.
      ]. In another study, four COVID-19 patients coughed five times in front of a Petri dish (20 cm distance) with a surgical mask, a cotton mask or without a mask. Without a mask 2.6 log10 viral copies per mL were detected, with a surgical mask it was 2.4, and with a cotton mask 1.9 log10 viral copies per mL [
      • Bae S.
      • Kim M.C.
      • Kim J.Y.
      • Cha H.H.
      • Lim J.S.
      • Jung J.
      • et al.
      Effectiveness of surgical and cotton masks in blocking SARS-CoV-2: a controlled comparison in 4 patients.
      ]. Household transmission was more likely when the primary case and other household members did not wear a mask at home resulting in the possibility of unprotected transmission [
      • Wang Y.
      • Tian H.
      • Zhang L.
      • Zhang M.
      • Guo D.
      • Wu W.
      • et al.
      Reduction of secondary transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in households by face mask use, disinfection and social distancing: a cohort study in Beijing, China.
      ]. Data on a protective effect of face masks when only worn by healthy subjects in an endemic COVID-19 setting are not available. Despite these results it was shown in South Korea that none of 35 HCWs with close contacts to a COVID-19 patient developed symptoms or were PCR positive in the nasopharynx although they only wore a surgical mask for more than 10 min during activities including aerosol-generating procedures such as intubation [
      • Ng K.
      • Poon B.H.
      • Kiat Puar T.H.
      • Shan Quah J.L.
      • Loh W.J.
      • Wong Y.J.
      • et al.
      COVID-19 and the Risk to Health Care Workers: A Case Report.
      ]. In addition, one study could show that a four-day surgical mask partition between cages reduces the risk of non-contact transmission between artificially infected and naïve golden Syrian hamsters [
      • Chan J.F.
      • Yuan S.
      • Zhang A.J.
      • Poon V.K.
      • Chan C.C.
      • Lee A.C.
      • et al.
      Surgical mask partition reduces the risk of non-contact transmission in a golden Syrian hamster model for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).
      ].
      Importantly, a used face mask worn by a SARS-CoV-2 spreader will be contaminated. After only five coughs all surgical or cotton face masks worn by COVID-19 patients were contaminated on the outer surface whereas samples from the inner surface were mostly negative [
      • Bae S.
      • Kim M.C.
      • Kim J.Y.
      • Cha H.H.
      • Lim J.S.
      • Jung J.
      • et al.
      Effectiveness of surgical and cotton masks in blocking SARS-CoV-2: a controlled comparison in 4 patients.
      ]. Chin et al. found that the virus can remain infectious or detectable for up to seven days on the outer layer of a surgical mask, on the inner layer for four days [
      • Chin A.W.H.
      • Chu J.T.S.
      • Perera M.R.A.
      • Hui K.P.Y.
      • Yen H.L.
      • Chan M.C.W.
      • et al.
      Stability of SARS-CoV-2 in different environmental conditions.
      ]. Although the results are only based on three independent triplicates, this finding should have implications for the re-use of face masks in a shortage situation [
      • Kampf G.
      • Scheithauer S.
      • Lemmen S.
      • Saliou P.
      • Suchomel M.
      COVID-19-associated shortage of alcohol-based hand rubs, face masks, medical gloves and gowns - proposal for a risk-adapted approach to ensure patient and healthcare worker safety.
      ].
      Wearing a face mask is recommended for HCWs in case of suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients [
      WHO
      Infection prevention and control during health care when novel coronavirus (nCoV) infection is suspected. Interim guidance. 19 March 2020.
      ,
      • Kirby T.
      Australian Government releases face masks to protect against coronavirus.
      ] although it was described in Hong Kong that 11 of 413 HCWs had unprotected exposure to confirmed COVID-19 cases, none of these were infected [
      • Cheng V.C.C.
      • Wong S.C.
      • Chen J.H.K.
      • Yip C.C.Y.
      • Chuang V.W.M.
      • Tsang O.T.Y.
      • et al.
      Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong.
      ]. Wearing a face mask may also be useful for HCWs when mild respiratory symptoms occur because in the Netherlands 4.1% of such HCWs were positive for SARS-CoV-2 [
      • Reusken C.B.
      • Buiting A.
      • Bleeker-Rovers C.
      • Diederen B.
      • Hooiveld M.
      • Friesema I.
      • et al.
      Rapid assessment of regional SARS-CoV-2 community transmission through a convenience sample of healthcare workers, the Netherlands, March 2020.
      ]. Even universal masking in hospitals by HCWs has been proposed although the expected effect was described as marginal [
      • Klompas M.
      • Morris C.A.
      • Sinclair J.
      • Pearson M.
      • Shenoy E.S.
      Universal Masking in Hospitals in the Covid-19 Era.